Talk:World War II/Archive 55
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Do we need more than one commander per country on the infobox?
Can anybody comment on this addition [1]?Anyway, even if Truman is accepted, Churchill cannot go after him. --Paul Siebert (talk) 21:58, 23 May 2018 (UTC)
- I think listing only the national leaders of the major powers is quite sufficient for this level of article. The various sub-articles can be more specific depending on their subject areas. I agree Churchill should be listed before Truman; he played one of the most prominent roles for most of the war, whereas Truman was almost a non-entity on the world stage up until FDR's death.
- Sorry, the question was "do we need more than ONE commander (sorry for a typo)? If I remember correct, the infobox always contained just one commander per a country.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:32, 23 May 2018 (UTC)
- Tough. Also, because 'which country' is another controversial issue. I'd say just one, but Japanese is a problematic case. I think a good case can be made for Tojo, in fact he is likely a better choice if we have to chose him or the Emperor (who was more of a figurehead). I'd oppose adding Truman, he presided over the mopping up. Just like we don't add the British PM who replaced Churchill around that time (and nobody even remembers his name outside historians, for the same reason). (Btw, I am glad France is not there, keeping the 3 Allies is enough... on that note, I am not really happy with Chiang Kai-shek - China wasn't that important of a war theater, through of course this may be a bit of my Western bias speaking about a front where next to no Westerners participated in...). --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here 09:42, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
- Euro-bias. Without China bogging down 1.5 million Japanese troops, then Soviet Union would have faced Two Front war (Nazi on west, Japan on east), then the outcome of WW2 would surely be rewritten. China was instrumental in preventing USSR from getting into a Two Front war and had basically fought Japan to a stalemate. Rwat128 (talk) 21:09, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
- This has been discussed many times before, with the previous version reflecting the consensus of who to include. From memory, this was settled through a RfC. I've reverted the change. Nick-D (talk) 11:30, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
- Just a response to Piotrus's comment: Truman was the one who dropped the A-bombs on Japan, so he is significant. I don't know what role Clement Attlee played at the end of WW2, but he should be treated with contempt just because a Wikipedia editor doesn't remember his name. And China was a highly significant war theatre. In loss of life, China came third after the USSR and Germany. Chiang was treated as a major world leader at the time, for example, participating in the Cairo Conference. China was alone in East Asia (apart from the USSR) in not surrendering to Japan, after the British Empire had lost Hong Kong and Singapore. China, which had been fighting Japan long before the Westerners, lost its major cities but still hung on. It had some support from the US including the Flying Tigers. So China and Chiang has to be mentioned.--Jack Upland (talk) 11:45, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
- Significance of atomic bombing in Japanese decision to surrender is questionable, so that argument does not prove Truman's significance.
- Regarding China, it is a traditional American view that it was significant (Churchill disagreed with that in his "Second World War"). China was virtually defeated by 1941, it poses no significant military prob;em for Japan. It was in the same state the USSR would be had Barbarossa achieved its goal: a vast land devoid of military industry and presenting minimal military threat. Hitler didn't plan to conquer the Asian part of the USSR, because he was not interested in that. Japanese hardly needed to establish full control over whole China, but when they needed to advance further into China's mainland, they did that easily in (operation Ichi-Go) even in 1944, when their failure in Pacific was evident.-Paul Siebert (talk) 15:38, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
- China was winning over 50% of the major battles with Japan since 1939. See Military engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War, this shows that China was winning over half the major battle engagements with Japan since 1939, long before US entered WW2 against Japan. So China was definitely not "defeated by 1941", the Japanese was virtually stalemated in China, with the territorial controls shifting back and forth.Rwat128 (talk) 21:09, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
- Regarding China, it is a traditional American view that it was significant (Churchill disagreed with that in his "Second World War"). China was virtually defeated by 1941, it poses no significant military prob;em for Japan. It was in the same state the USSR would be had Barbarossa achieved its goal: a vast land devoid of military industry and presenting minimal military threat. Hitler didn't plan to conquer the Asian part of the USSR, because he was not interested in that. Japanese hardly needed to establish full control over whole China, but when they needed to advance further into China's mainland, they did that easily in (operation Ichi-Go) even in 1944, when their failure in Pacific was evident.-Paul Siebert (talk) 15:38, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
- regarding China--FDR was the only one who considered China important--the other Allies all ignored Chiang. FDR thought that the millions of Chinese soldiers would fight the Japanese Army--they did not do very well and kept losing. It was the Russian army that moved in in 1945--FDR had been begging Stalin to do so and Stalin did so on schedule. As for numbers killed that seems to be an off-beat fascination on the part of lots of Wiki editors. Military historians emphasize winning and losing battles, not how many civilians died. Rjensen (talk) 17:12, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
- Indeed. Perhaps we need to re-examine or restart the mentioned RfC with the question of China (it was big, it had a large army, and it didn't seem to have mattered at all, Japan was defeated by the Allies, de facto US, and that result is unlikely to have changed if the China had surrendered. I am not saying China should not be mentioned in the article, it was a front with some notable events, ex. Nanking, but if China is mentioned in the lead, so should be IMHO France with De Gaulle, for example... and I'd prefer we just stick to the Big Three+the Axis). (And nobody commented re: Tojo vs Hirohito, see Hirohito#Accountability_for_Japanese_war_crimes, historians still debate how much control he head, whereas nobody doubts Hideki Tojo was responsible for many Japanese decisions). --Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| reply here 06:43, 25 May 2018 (UTC)
- regarding China--FDR was the only one who considered China important--the other Allies all ignored Chiang. FDR thought that the millions of Chinese soldiers would fight the Japanese Army--they did not do very well and kept losing. It was the Russian army that moved in in 1945--FDR had been begging Stalin to do so and Stalin did so on schedule. As for numbers killed that seems to be an off-beat fascination on the part of lots of Wiki editors. Military historians emphasize winning and losing battles, not how many civilians died. Rjensen (talk) 17:12, 24 May 2018 (UTC)
- Strongly Oppose reopening RfC. As the original member who participated in the RfC on commanders in WW2 Infobox back in 2010, see Archive 44[1] in 2011, Archive 10 [2] in 2013, and Archive 45[3] in 2011. I've participated in each of these dating back in 2010 and was originally the one who asserted inclusion of Chiang Kai Shek. There is absolutely no need to re-open this, you should read the Consensus that was ultimately formed. It was very conclusive about inclusion of China. Period!Phead128 (talk) 21:25, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
- The atomic bombing is significant regardless of its role in the Japanese surrender (which is basically a meaningless question). Many historians talk about the lives lost in war, but perhaps military historians don't. This is an article about history, not just military history. We have to look at the human toll on China, which was major. And that makes China significant. And China also tied down a large number of Japanese troops — more than were deployed in the South Pacific. The difference between China and France is that France surrendered and China didn't. You could also draw a parallel between the British Empire and China. The British Empire lost almost every battle, and lost major cities like Hong Kong and Singapore. If the USA and the USSR had not entered the war against Germany, the British Empire could not have won. But significance is not about success.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:49, 25 May 2018 (UTC)
- Several works are devoted specially to the role of bombing in Japanese surrender (see, e.g. Pape. Why japan surrendered). That China was tying down Japanese troops was not too important, because they could not be used in Pacific when US obtained naval superiority. In addition, the most significant troops were permanently stationed along Amur to protect from a possible attack of the USSR, which kept more than half million troops there during the whole war.
- Regarding Britain, it was the only power that was actively resisting to Hitler from the very beginning to the very end, and served as a core around which all new Alleys united.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:22, 25 May 2018 (UTC)
- Strongly disagree. This is Euro-bias. Without China bogging down 1.5 million Japanese troops, then Soviet Union would have faced Two Front war (Nazi on west, Japan on east), then the outcome of WW2 would surely be rewritten. China was instrumental in preventing USSR from getting into a Two Front war and had basically fought Japan to a stalemate. Rwat128 (talk) 21:09, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
- From memory, the RfC which led to the current formulation of the countries and leads in the infobox was a long-running process with a fairly conclusive result in the end. I don't see what would be gained from re-opening the matter. Nick-D (talk) 09:54, 25 May 2018 (UTC)
- If under "current" you mean this, I agree. The current scheme is confusing and ridiculous. If we add Attlee, than Chamberlain should be added too. I think formal criteria is not the best approach.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:58, 25 May 2018 (UTC)
- Strongly Oppose reopening RfC. As the original member who participated in the RfC on commanders in WW2 Infobox back in 2011, see Archive 44[4] in 2011, Archive 10 [5] in 2013, and Archive 45[6] in 2011. I've participated in each of these dating back in 2011 and was originally the one who asserted inclusion of Chiang Kai Shek. There is absolutely no need to re-open this, you should read the Consensus that was ultimately formed. It was very conclusive about inclusion of China. Period! Phead128 (talk) 21:25, 26 July 2018 (UTC)
Figures in the "Casualties and war crimes" section
I propose to make a strategic decision about figures in this section. I find illogical when killing of 6 million Jews or several million of other civilians are mentioned along with killing of several thousands of others. I agree that Katyn or Vohlyn massacre were separate events, however, killing of 6 million Jews was a series of single events too. Why do we combine some events under a single umbrella name and explicitly mention few others? Thus, the section says about "millions of other Slavs", and then it specifically mentions 200,000 ethnic Serbs. What is the reason to separate ethnic Serbs from other Slavs?
I propose to remove these figures, and add just to list those Nazi collaborators (Ustaces, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian and other nationalists) who were engaged in mass execution of civilians.
In addition, if population transfer in the USSR is mentioned, the story about deportation of ethnic Japanese in the USA should be mentioned too.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:43, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
- Because Soviets, Ustaces and UPA waged a separate conflicts within WWII, if you notice the first set of numbers relates to "civilians died as a direct or as an indirect result of Nazi racist policies" so they are related to German atrocities. Btw, I have no issue if you write a statement about Japanese deportations. Finally, I have an issue with lumping several nations as Slavs, that's rather dismissive, when you list other rather small sub-categories (Gypsies, Freemasons, Jehovah's Witnesses, homosexuals, etc.) and then 200 million people are just Slavs. --E-960 (talk) 13:56, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
- Also, if you want to go down that road and question every detail, then why not remove items such as "firebombing of Hamburg", how many other cites in Germany and especially Japan were fire bombed, or "every fifth West German was a refugee from the east"? --E-960 (talk) 14:07, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
- You probably did not understand me. Hamburg is mentioned separately, because it was an event, and it is mentioned as an event in the Course of war section, not in Casualties section. Hamburg gave a start to the massive bombing campaign, and that is why it is mentioned separately, in a wider context.
- In contrast, I see no logic behind mentioning Serbs as Axis victims separately from other Slavs. Ustaches were the Nazi puppet regime, OUN also was Nazi collaborator, as well as many other ethnic groups who were subordinated to Nazi. Many Belorussians were killed not by Nazi, but by Latvian, Ukrainian or Lithuanian militia, why don't we say that? Do you mean only Germans and Croatians committed war crimes?
- A correct and unbiased way to say that would be to write that, besides Jews, XX millions civilians, mostly Slavs were killed, by Nazi, as well as by Nazi puppet states (Ustaches, etc), and ethnic militia (Latvians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, etc). Besides that, some semi-independent political groups, for example UPA were engaged in massive ethnic cleansing (Vohlynia Massacre), and several ethnic formations of Wehrmacht composed of POWs (Russian Riberation Army) or volunteers committed numerous war crimes during antipartisan warfare and suppression of uprisings (Warsaw, etc). That is a neutral way to do that.
- War crimes of the USSR should be mentioned separately, and a link should be provided. I also find incorrect to write about "deportation to Siberia" (most ethnic groups were deported to Central Asia or Far East), and to combine executed and deported (these are two very different things).
- Re Slavs vs Gypsies, I do see logic behind that. Gypsies were killed because they were Gypsies, but Russians were not killed due to their ethnicity: they were killed because they were Slavs, and Nazi saw no difference between Belorussian and Russian population. I see no problem with mentioning of ethnicity when it is relevant (it is relevant in the case of Jews or Gypsies, but not for Russians).
- Re deportations, there were Axis deportations and Allied deportations, we need to group them accordingly.
- Finally, I am not questioning every details, I am talking about a uniform approach to providing details: it is incorrect and biased approach to combine 6 million of victims in one line and then to talk in details about tens of thousands of others.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:44, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
Paul Siebert, this is getting old, are you now the article 'decider' because for the past 2 months or so, you hit this article by storm, all you are doing is either trying to change everything in the article or challenge things. And, it's really annoying to see all those red herring arguments, above you mentioned that there is nothing about the internment of Japanese-Americans, so I said you should put that in, but all of a sudden you are not interested in doing that, so that was just a excuse to attack the new sentence. This is Wikipedia, so stop trying to "fix" everything, because by nature of the process you will never have a "perfect" paragraph in each section. --E-960 (talk) 15:10, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
- Please, correct me if I am wrong, but I thought it is our duty to fix everything we find incorrect. I have not been working with this article for several years, I see that some changes that happened during this time were positive, but I also see something that is definitely not an improvement. Why cannot I propose to discuss these changes?
- Do you call me a 'decider' because I decide to discuss something on a talk page? I found it illogical. If other users disagree with what I propose, I make no changes, if the changes are supported, they are implemented.
- By the way, it is not I but you who started to add more details in this section. The recent collage discussion was initiated not by me too.
- Re Japanese internment, I probably misunderstood you: I thought you proposed to add an info about deportation of Asian population committed by Japanese, not internment of Japanese-Americans, so I decided that was off-topic. Internment of Japanese Americans was removed recently (not by me, btw), because we tried to get rid of smaller scale events. However, these small facts seem to re-appear, so it is logical to return to this subject again. I personally don't think we need to add all of that into this huge article, that is why we need to agree about some general threshold for inclusion.
- --Paul Siebert (talk) 15:33, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
- "Duty"? You are taking this a bit far, Wikipedia is not the army, and when you say "fix everything we find incorrect", it comes across as a loaded statement because not everything you think needs "fixing" actually does. Most things you challenge can be categorized as personal preferences. --E-960 (talk) 15:58, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
- Of course, Wikipedia is not an army, don't take my words too literally. If you think I am advocating my personal preferences, please, explain what exactly do you mean, because, I myself think all what I say is supported by reliable secondary sources. By the way, there is a consensus that any significant change in this article should be discussed no the talk page first. You started to edit the section without discussing the changes first, and I, instead of reverting you, started a talk page discussion. I see absolutely no problem with what I am doing.
- I see other problems with this article, and I am intended to fix them in close future. However, I will do that through a talk page discussion (we already agreed upon some changes that I have not implemented yet). It is nothing wrong in challenging some article's aspects on the talk page, and I don't understand who and why can disagree with that approach.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:19, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
- The rules you describe are not really Wikipedia guidelines just your interpretation of them, so now an editor before making any changes needs to submit a discussion and you will weight in on whether you think they are acceptable? That really does come across as policing the article. Besides in a previous discussion you complained that there is too much focus on Germany in general, now I added one short 20 word sentence about the Ukrainian insurgents, and added detail on the Soviets and Croatian Ustaches, and you challenge that. --E-960 (talk) 16:43, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
- "Duty"? You are taking this a bit far, Wikipedia is not the army, and when you say "fix everything we find incorrect", it comes across as a loaded statement because not everything you think needs "fixing" actually does. Most things you challenge can be categorized as personal preferences. --E-960 (talk) 15:58, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
- I find your tone redundantly aggressive. Just open this and read the page notice (after "Attention editors"). I am not sure I misinterpreted what this page notice say.
- Regarding your recent edits, I do not think they are incorrect or irrelevant, I am just thinking about bringing them in accordance with the overall section's style. It is absolutely correct to inform a reader that not only Nazi and not only Germans committed war crimes, but, in my opinion, the way this information is presented is not fully correct. More specifically, if some user will see a mention of 100,000 killed Poles, they may decide to add the number of Jews killed in Kovno pogrom, or to explicitly mention the number of Ajraskommando's victims, and so on, and so forth. How can we stop this section from uncontrollable infation in that case? Who will decide which concrete incident deserves mention, and which should be excluded?--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:49, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
Soviet deportations and Japanese American internment aren't really comparable, hundreds of thousands of Soviet deportees died. I am not necessarily opposed to inclusion of Japanese American internment, but drawing any equivalence with Soviet deportations would be blatant Stalin apologia. Also I don't really see much point listing separate collaborators, as Nazis recruited collaborators among almost all the nations they occupied except Jews.--Staberinde (talk) 18:18, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
- Germans recruited a number of Jews, eg. Gestapo informants. Jewish collaborators were proportionally rare and many of them murdered by the Germans. Xx236 (talk) 09:11, 30 July 2018 (UTC)
- Whereas I agree that many Soviet deportation events were more punitive than dictated by military considerations, one has to take into account that American deportations occurred in a situation when there was absolutely no immediate military threat. It is not correct to compare deportation of Volga Germans in a situation when Wehrmach was just few hundred kilometers from Volga and internment of Japanese Americans in a situation when there was no military activity on a continent at all. We cannot imagine how severe the actions of the US government (and spontaneous actions of the US civilians) would be had at least one Nazi bomber dropped a single bomb at, for example, Manhattan. I even do not consider as situation of a full scale German or Japanese invasion of continental US. In that sense, you are absolutely right: it is absolutely impossible to equate Stalin's deportation with internment of Japanese Americans, because a context where these events occurred was totally different. I would say, it would be even incorrect to equate different deportation events in the USSR: for example, preventive deportation of Volga Germans had much more analogy with Japanese internment, whereas deportation of Chechens was more punitive.
- Regarding mortality, it was high among ordinary civilians and refugees too.
- Regarding recruitment of collaborators, one must discriminate between (i) those who was recruited semi-forcibly (for example, POWs recruited to Russian Liberation Army, or some ciivilians from Belirussia or Baltic states), (ii) those who volunteered enthusiastically (Ukrainians, some Lithuanians and Latvians), (iii) those who collaborated with some Nazi puppet regime (Ustaches, Slovaks), and (iv) those who never collaborated (Poles).
- However, I agree that in this article we need to show just a general picture. To do that, we must agree about the acceptable level of detailisation, and to apply this criterion globally in this section.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:42, 9 July 2018 (UTC)
- I don't agree with your approach to editing in the first place - you're constantly trying to question every detail and re-engineer the entire article, and this in effect is a form of POV pushing. You need to respect the input of other editors, which built this article over time. This text does not need the type of radical changes you propose Also, your argument why we should include a reference to the bombing of Hamburg, but remove other individual examples in the text from other events is the best example of POV. Why have such detail as "reduce morale, and "de-house" the [German] civilian population"? If that's that case than I would like to add and expand such detail regarding the German strategy behind the bombing of Warsaw and London. --E-960 (talk) 03:16, 10 July 2018 (UTC)
- By the way, about five years ago I was editing this article, and I added a significant amount of text to it. Now, when I came back I found that the article was changed significantly. However, I don't consider it as disrespect to my efforts, that is a normal editorial process. In connection to that, I am wondering why did you decide that the article in its present state is something that is supposed to be untouchable, whereas it was quite ok to change the article during last 5 years? By saying that, I do not imply I want to restore the old version (as I already said, some new additions are definitely an improvement). However, I find you approach, do-not-touch-it-because-I-think-it-is-good, totally unacceptable: if you like some concrete version, be ready to defend it when someone challenges it. If you cannot find good counter-arguments and sources, then you cannot prevent others from editing.
- Your reference to POV pushing is hardly constructive: you actually accuse me of disruptive editing, which means an accusation of bad faith. As a rule, such accusations require solid evidences, so it would be good if you avoid them in future. The atmosphere of this talk page is very friendly, let's preserve it.
- Your argument about Hamburg is something I cannot understand. We definitely need to tell about strategic bombing (I believe, you agree with that), however, we cannot tell about Cologne, Dresden,, Leipzig, Berlin, and other cities separately. It was quite logical to mention just one event, which marked a start of this campaign. What POV do you see there? However, if you have anoth idea, let's discuss it. Frankly, before I added the sentence about Hamburg, I tried to discuss it on the talk page, but majority of users expressed little interest to it. I myself do not find this sentence optimal, if you have any idea how to improve it, let's do that.
- Re Warsaw or London, as far as I know, Axis and Western Allies had different strategic approaches towards bombing. Axis leaders saw mostly military component in that, but the Western Allies believed one of the most important goals of bombing was to reduce population's morale, and, taking into account that they were democratic powers, they considered strategic bombing as a political tool (the tool to convince a nation to surrender). In contrast, Nazi, being totalitarian, didn't think in that way. Ironically, strategic bombing would be efficient against democratic powers, and it proved to be inefficient against totalitarian regimes, but, it was America and Britain who chose this tool, because it fit better in their mentality. I can find sources that describe this theory (I don't remember it right now).
- I also do not understand why do you separate Warsaw and London from other events. Other bombing campaigns were equally destructive, for example, bombing of Stalingrad, which almost completely destroyed the city. However, we do not discuss it, because it was just a part of a bigger battle. In connection to that, do you find correct the approach when the battle of Stalingrad, which, by its scale and strategic implications, dwarfs some theatres of war, is described just with one sentence, whereas many other minuscule events are covered in much more details?
- Meanwhile, as you probably noticed, this article is not a featured article, and there is no guarantee that it will remain a good article if someone decided to review it. That means we have a lot of things to do, because this article tells about a very important subject, and it would be very good if we upgraded it to the FA status.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:59, 10 July 2018 (UTC)
- I don't agree with your approach to editing in the first place - you're constantly trying to question every detail and re-engineer the entire article, and this in effect is a form of POV pushing. You need to respect the input of other editors, which built this article over time. This text does not need the type of radical changes you propose Also, your argument why we should include a reference to the bombing of Hamburg, but remove other individual examples in the text from other events is the best example of POV. Why have such detail as "reduce morale, and "de-house" the [German] civilian population"? If that's that case than I would like to add and expand such detail regarding the German strategy behind the bombing of Warsaw and London. --E-960 (talk) 03:16, 10 July 2018 (UTC)
- The reason for that is the large number of unsourced statements. At some point I'm going to go through it and remove them. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:33, 11 July 2018 (UTC)
- Let's not do that unilaterally. It would be better to come to a general consensus on the inclusion threshold and than act accordingly. I think we need at least to give E-960 some time to respond and share their ideas on that account. --Paul Siebert (talk) 00:54, 12 July 2018 (UTC)
- The reason for that is the large number of unsourced statements. At some point I'm going to go through it and remove them. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:33, 11 July 2018 (UTC)
- There is nothing to discuss. The threshold for inclusion is verifiability. Everything must be properly sourced. Unsourced text is forbidden, and adding it is absolutely prohibited. If I remove it it, any attempt to restore without a proper reference will be a blockable offence. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 10:58, 12 July 2018 (UTC)
- I think if you put a "citation needed" template, all needed references will be added soon. The problem is not only in verifiability, because not every verified statement deserves inclusion in this article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 12:19, 12 July 2018 (UTC)
- I agree with comment by Staberinde above. My very best wishes (talk) 18:17, 10 July 2018 (UTC)
Biased history of bombings of cities
The text ignores German bombings in Poland, it describes British and German victims.
- Bombing of Wieluń - the first bombing during WWII
- Bombing of Warsaw in World War II#Siege of Warsaw including incendiary bombs - thousands of civilians killed. Only recently German documents regarding planned bombing of Warsaw were bought. [2]
- Now the first bombing is The Blitz, 1940-1941, More than 40,000 civilians were killed by Luftwaffe bombing during the war, a number comparable to the number of Polish civilian victims of bombings in September 1939. The cruelty of WWII started in Poland 1939, the other crimes logically continue the September. Hitler instructed Wehrmacht generals Vernichtung Polens im Vordergrund. Ziel ist Beseitigung der lebendigen Kräfte. Herz verschließen gegen Mitleid. Brutales Vorgehen. Der Stärkere hat das Recht. Größte Härte. Jede sich neu bildende lebendige Kraft ist sofort wieder zu vernichten. Verfolgung bis zur völligen Vernichtung. [3]] WWI was cruel but it was mostly a war between soldiers. The Germans implemented colonial wars in Europe.
- In June 1943 the British and Americans began a strategic bombing campaign against Germany with a goal to disrupt the war economy, reduce morale, and "de-house" the civilian population - German goals in Poland should be also described.
- Bombing of Hamburg in World War II - killing 42,600 civilians. If Hamburg gave a start to the massive bombing campaign so Wieluń did either. Xx236 (talk) 09:02, 30 July 2018 (UTC)
- I am not convinced that the Blitz would deserve a place outside the context of the larger UK-Germany campaign, and in fact it is included in that section. There is currently not dedicated section to bombings of civilians targer (NB the 1940 German bombing of Rotterdam with many more casualties than Wielun is also not mentioned.).
- What would make Wielun worthwhile to mention, is that be taking on a civilian target Germany already on day 1 of the war in Europe engaged in total war. But outside such a context, I think it is too much of a footnote to this already overburdened article. Arnoutf (talk) 15:02, 30 July 2018 (UTC)
- Agree, a short note stating that Germans bombed civilian targets from 'day one' would be fine, but no more than one short sentence. --E-960 (talk) 15:21, 30 July 2018 (UTC)
- What would make Wielun worthwhile to mention, is that be taking on a civilian target Germany already on day 1 of the war in Europe engaged in total war. But outside such a context, I think it is too much of a footnote to this already overburdened article. Arnoutf (talk) 15:02, 30 July 2018 (UTC)
- Xx236, with due respect, bombing of Warsaw was just a minor incident as compared with, for example, bombing of Stalingrad. Strategic bombing campaign deserves a separate attention for a very serious reason: this was the only bombing campaign that was considered as an independent military campaign, which was planned according some concrete internal logic and had a long term strategic objectives. All other bombings served an auxiliary role (each of them were just a part of some concrete military operation), whereas the bombing of Axis cities can be considered as an independent theatre of war.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:15, 30 July 2018 (UTC)
- As I have written, Germans prepared the bombing of Warsaw before the war. There is a basic difference between the preparation of a total war and moving step by step during the war.
- The war in the West was just a minor incident, so maybe we should rewrite proportionally the whole text?
- Joshua Zimmerman ("The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939-1945") quotes Jodl's opinion that France and UK were able to win in 1939. So maybe not only Polish civilians were adressed by German bombs but French politicians too. So maybe the war in Poland wasn't just a minor incident?
- WHy don't we inform about Hitler's instructions and Einsatzgruppen? They are much more important than Danzig. Xx236 (talk) 06:38, 31 July 2018 (UTC)
- Xx236, with due respect, bombing of Warsaw was just a minor incident as compared with, for example, bombing of Stalingrad. Strategic bombing campaign deserves a separate attention for a very serious reason: this was the only bombing campaign that was considered as an independent military campaign, which was planned according some concrete internal logic and had a long term strategic objectives. All other bombings served an auxiliary role (each of them were just a part of some concrete military operation), whereas the bombing of Axis cities can be considered as an independent theatre of war.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:15, 30 July 2018 (UTC)
- I didn't say war in Poland was just a minor incident, I said the scale of Warsaw bombing was relatively moderate to deserve a separate attention. Re Zimmerman, he is hardly a big expert in WWII as whole to pay too much attention to his opinion.
- Re "not only Polish civilians were addressed by German bombs," you are missing a very important point. Hitler, as well as other totalitarian leaders, didn't pay much attention to the opinion of civilians, so he was not planning to send any messages by bombing of enemy's cities. The primary objective of Nazi war efforts was military conquest of the enemy, which was supposed to be achieved by defeating enemy's army, and any bombing was just a component of the army's war efforts. Any Nazi bombing campaign, including the Battle of Britain, was just a prelude to a land invasion. However, you are absolutely right, and a massive bombing campaign could have served as a message for democratic nations, and that could have affected a decision of democratic leaders to ask for peace (this doctrine was proposed by Giulio Douhet, an Italian war theorist). However, since Hitler was a totalitarian leader, this idea contradicted to his belief, because he thought people's opinion means nothing for a leader. That was a primary reason why this doctrine was not adopted (another reason was that German industry was less powerful than American one).
- In contrast, democratic leaders adopted this doctrine, because it fit their democratic mentality. Ironically, this approach proved to be not working for the German population that was controlled by a totalitarian regime. Nevertheless, by bombing German cities, Allies were trying to address directly to the people to convince the t=nation to surrender. That is why Anglo-American strategic bombing was a separate war campaign, in contrast to bombing of Coventry, Stalingrad, Belgrade, Warsaw, Leningrad etc, which were just a part of military operations against these cities.
- Re "The war in the West was just a minor incident, so maybe we should rewrite proportionally the whole text? " What exactky do you mean?
- Re Einsatzgruppen, we have a War crime section, it should be there, not in the Course of the war section.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:51, 31 July 2018 (UTC)
- What specific change to the article's text is being proposed here? General complaints are not very helpful. I'm wary about placing undue emphasis on Poland, but seeing the text being proposed could help to alleviate this. Nick-D (talk) 22:43, 31 July 2018 (UTC)
- Undue emphasis - the destruction of several towns and nassive bombing of the city of Warsaw, massive executions of civilians in 1939 to enslave the Polish nation.
- WWII in the East was an extermination, not a traditional war like the WWII. You may not describe genocides as a military play of uniformed boys. Xx236 (talk) 06:48, 2 August 2018 (UTC)
- The other problem is economy as described in Hitler's Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare by Götz Aly. German people fought till 1945 beacuse of Hitler's populism. Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning and Bloodlands by Timothy D. Snyder explain many aspects of the war in Europe. Germany needed fertilizers rather than arms. Xx236 (talk) 06:55, 2 August 2018 (UTC)
- EE nationalistic historians - exactly. Anyone who opposes the Western-centric traditional narration is nationalistic.
- I just wanted to write about Women in WWII but I have found Women in World War II. It describes the few women who fought but doesn't describe the millions of female victims of the WWII. Don't civilian victims belong to the war?Xx236 (talk) 08:09, 2 August 2018 (UTC)
- General complaints and comments on other articles really aren't useful. Nick-D (talk) 08:34, 2 August 2018 (UTC)
- Exactly. For example, if Xx236 believes "WWII in the East was an extermination, not a traditional war" (which, in my opinion, is a correct assertion), they are more than welcome to expand the section that is specially devoted to this aspect (I mean, "Genocide and war crimes"). If they believe too much attention is devoted to the hostilities in the West, let's think together how to give a more balanced view. Xx236, you are not a customer, but a user, if you see something should be changed, don't complain, but change it. Nobody will do this work for you.
- Regarding Warsaw bombing, I totally disagree. Warsaw was not destroyed by bombing in 1939, but Stalingrad, as well as many Soviet, Japanese or German cities, was. Unless you provide any additional reason why should we speak about Warsaw separately, I don't see why should we do that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 11:15, 2 August 2018 (UTC)
Semi-protected edit request on 18 August 2018
Need more alliance members listed J.Greeny123459 (talk) 07:31, 18 August 2018 (UTC)
- Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. Danski454 (talk) 09:58, 18 August 2018 (UTC)
Semi-protected edit request on 9 September 2018
Can I please get permission to edit this source? I'm only going to either add in info or edit things that were written to make them better. Pixelgun3dhacker (talk) 23:32, 9 September 2018 (UTC)
- You just need to become an autoconfirmed user. That will happen automatically very soon.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:11, 10 September 2018 (UTC)
- Not done: as said above, you need to be an autoconfirmed user. QueerFilmNerdtalk 04:03, 10 September 2018 (UTC)
The Kursk battle
I am surprised to see that the Kursk battle is mentioned only passingly. To the best of my knowledge, this was the largest tank battle of the II World War; and it would be advisable to devote at least a short paragraph to it. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Efroimsk (talk • contribs) 23:19, 13 August 2018 (UTC)
- It has been previously pointed out that the Eastern Front is somewhat neglected in this article. At the same time, in an article like this everything only gets the briefest mention.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:51, 14 August 2018 (UTC)
- There is currently about a para on this battle split across several paras. It was one of many huge battles on the Eastern Front, and wasn't decisive: historians now agree that it was something of a stalemate, with the successful Soviet counter-offensives which followed Kursk being more important to the outcome of the war. I think the coverage is about right, noting that this is a very high level article. Nick-D (talk) 10:06, 14 August 2018 (UTC)
- Nick-D, you are not right: "Battle of Kursk" ≠ "Unternehmen Zitadelle". "Operation Citadel" was conceived by the Germans, and their plan was to encircle a group of Soviet armies around the city of Kursk. This objective was not achieved, and the German advance had stalled (the outcome was "indecisive"). That was the end of the battle from the German point of view, but not from the Soviet one. The Soviet plan (from the very beginning) had two steps: at the first step, they planned to stop German attack (and they achieved that goal by 16th of July), and, after the attack had stalled, to start their own offensive. That is why the Battle of Kursk was longer than "Unternehmen Zitadelle": it includes "Operation Kutizov" and "Operation Rumyantsev", and the total result was a decisive Soviet victory that marked a totall loss of strategic initiative by Wehrmacht in the East, and dispelled last Hitler's hope on a separate peace with Stalin on favourable conditions. In other words, this battle had enormous political and strategical effects that marked a qualitative change in the course of the war, and that fact definitely should be stressed in the article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:02, 30 August 2018 (UTC)
- Yes, the Battle of Kursk was a decisive Soviet victory.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:35, 10 September 2018 (UTC)
- Nick-D, you are not right: "Battle of Kursk" ≠ "Unternehmen Zitadelle". "Operation Citadel" was conceived by the Germans, and their plan was to encircle a group of Soviet armies around the city of Kursk. This objective was not achieved, and the German advance had stalled (the outcome was "indecisive"). That was the end of the battle from the German point of view, but not from the Soviet one. The Soviet plan (from the very beginning) had two steps: at the first step, they planned to stop German attack (and they achieved that goal by 16th of July), and, after the attack had stalled, to start their own offensive. That is why the Battle of Kursk was longer than "Unternehmen Zitadelle": it includes "Operation Kutizov" and "Operation Rumyantsev", and the total result was a decisive Soviet victory that marked a totall loss of strategic initiative by Wehrmacht in the East, and dispelled last Hitler's hope on a separate peace with Stalin on favourable conditions. In other words, this battle had enormous political and strategical effects that marked a qualitative change in the course of the war, and that fact definitely should be stressed in the article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:02, 30 August 2018 (UTC)
Semi-protected edit request on 10 September 2018
please change nether belligerent
to neither belligerent
because typo 83.31.88.249 (talk) 16:16, 10 September 2018 (UTC)
Bibliography
I tried to look for an additional book dealing with the WWII in this bibliography. But the bibliography contains ca. 240 titles. It is therefore totally useless. I would propose to delete 200 of this titles. Nearly 40 titles are sufficient to get more informations about this subjekt. Kind regards --Orik (talk) 18:21, 4 November 2018 (UTC)
- Those are the works which are referenced in the article, so they can't be removed. Nick-D (talk) 08:08, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
Italian partisans image
I reverted this edit, because we cannot have too many photos in this section. Meanwhile, I am wondering what purpose the Cairo photo serves in this section. The meeting with Chinese leader was not the most important event, Tehran conference was much more important. By saying that, I don't propose to replace this photo with the photo og the Big Three. Any ideas?--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:35, 31 October 2018 (UTC)
- I agree, and have just re-removed it. It's a dull photo of no clear historical significance. More broadly, there are way too many photos, and many don't seem well chosen. Given the topic of this article, it should only include high quality images of key topics, but instead we have a mixture of iconic photos and images of little clear significance. Regarding the Cairo photo, at the moment we have three essentially identical "family photos" from the Allied leader-level summits. One seems plenty. A photo of the "big three" leaders at either the Tehran or Yalta conferences would work best IMO - Tehran would be preferable as this was probably the most important such meeting. I'd suggest the image included in this section, which is clearly PD and good quality. Nick-D (talk) 06:07, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- But there are so many photos and so many events in the war that are significant to somewhere in the world. I guess it's interesting that Chiang was treated as one of a Big Three.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:33, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- He wasn't though: he was locked out of the much more important Tehran Conference which Cairo was held in preparation for, and not invited to any other leader-level meetings. The Canadian PM got similar treatment at the Quebec Conference, 1943 and Second Quebec Conference. Nick-D (talk) 08:40, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- But there are so many photos and so many events in the war that are significant to somewhere in the world. I guess it's interesting that Chiang was treated as one of a Big Three.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:33, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- If I remember correct, Churchill could not understand why Roosevelt exaggerated importance of China. It seems Chiang was treated as a member of a Big Three only by Roosevelt.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:36, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- Regarding the Tehran photo, I would prefer not to show Stalin's photo in the article without a serious reason. 1943 was the year of titanic tank battles, whereas the pictures do not create such an impression. so I would propose a photo with a Tiger tank. . I understand that is the second photo of the same battle, but this battle was a central event of the year.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:01, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- I don't think that we should have two photos of Kursk. Modern historians generally argue that the post-Kursk Soviet offensive was actually more significant than the battle itself (the German offensive was always doomed to failure, and the battle was something of a stalemate, but the Soviet offensive was a major victory which liberated much of the Ukraine). Nick-D (talk) 21:08, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- Regarding the Tehran photo, I would prefer not to show Stalin's photo in the article without a serious reason. 1943 was the year of titanic tank battles, whereas the pictures do not create such an impression. so I would propose a photo with a Tiger tank. . I understand that is the second photo of the same battle, but this battle was a central event of the year.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:01, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- Nick, Battle of Kursk did include a post-Citadel offensive. However, this offensive became possible only after the German offensive was stopped. Citadel was not doomed to failure: it failed only because the Germans attached the most heavily fortified region if human history. It took tremendous efforts to stop Germans. I agree that a success in Citadel could not have lead to a full German victory. However, it could lead to stabilisation of the frontline, and, probably, to a separate peace between Stalin and Hitler (this possibility was Roosevelt's nightmare).--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:24, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- Modern historians argue that the Soviets clearly had the upper hand in 1943, and would have been able to have stopped a German offensive anywhere. I haven't seen any suggestions that either Hitler or Stalin were looking for a negotiated end to the war in 1943. The general view seems to have been that the Germans would have been better off fighting defensively rather than attempting a major offensive, but this would have only delayed their defeat. See, for instance, David Glantz or Robert M. Citino's work on the topic. Nick-D (talk) 22:13, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- Nick, Battle of Kursk did include a post-Citadel offensive. However, this offensive became possible only after the German offensive was stopped. Citadel was not doomed to failure: it failed only because the Germans attached the most heavily fortified region if human history. It took tremendous efforts to stop Germans. I agree that a success in Citadel could not have lead to a full German victory. However, it could lead to stabilisation of the frontline, and, probably, to a separate peace between Stalin and Hitler (this possibility was Roosevelt's nightmare).--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:24, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- If I remember correct, it was Glanz who said: "After Stalingrad, it became clear that Germany would not win; after Kursk, it became clear the Soviets could not lose." That means before Kursk there was a possibility of some stalemate or even a separate peace at favourable (for Germany) conditions. That was the outcome Roosevelt tried to avoid, hence his idea of "unconditional surrender". You should remember that, according to Glanz, Kursk was the first battle in the whole war when Wehrmacht had not been successful in breaking through enemy's defence. That Germans would not succeed in that seems obvious retrospectively, but it was absolutely not obvious to those who were fighting in that war, and, importantly, that happened because the tremendous efforts of the Soviet army that, at cost of very high losses, tipped the balance to the Allied side. A time between Stalingrad and Kursk was a "gray zone" where the events could have turned in a direction that prevented the Axis complete defeat.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:11, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- Regarding Chiang, he didn't attend Tehran because Stalin didn't want to meet him because the USSR was neutral in the war against Japan. It's not surprising that the Canadian PM attended conferences in Quebec! During the war, China was part of the Big Four. In 1945, China became a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Canada and Australia didn't. Chiang's standing has suffered because lost the Chinese Civil War in 1949, but he was clearly considered a major world leader at the time. These days many English-speakers don't realise China was in the war. Therefore I would vote for including a picture of Chiang. And regarding Stalin, why not have a picture of him? We have plenty of pictures of Hitler.--Jack Upland (talk) 00:17, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- It is an interesting interpretation, although a little bit illogical. The main opponents of Japan were the US and Britain (not China). Nevertheless, Stalin saw no problem to meet the major Japan's enemy, Roosevelt, who already won several important battles in the war with Japan (China hadn't). How do you explain that Stalin saw no problem to meet Roosevelt, but expected to have problem after meeting with Chiang? I see no logic here. Second, in 1943, after Kursk and Midway, a situation has changed: it was clear that Japan is loosing the war, and Germany probably too, so it was Japan who was more concerned not to irritate USSR, not vise versa.
- Anyway, your own words demonstrate the importance of Chiang: if he was not invited to Tehran because Stalin didn't want to see him, that shows a real hierarchy. However, I suspect, the reason was different: I see absolutely no questions the Big Three could discuss with Chiang. Was China helpful in Pacific? No. Did it play any military role in Asia (except South-East China)? No. If we imagine a situation that Barbarossa was a success, this hypothetical situation would be an good analogy of a situation in China in 1943: Moscow (Peking), Leningrad (Shanghai), Nanking (Gorky), Sverdlovsk (Wuhan), and almost all other industrial centers are occupied, and further Axis advances are limited only with the conqueror's capability of controlling the occupied territories (Hitler didn't plan to move behind the A-A line, and the Japanese didn't move further just because they didn't need to; when they needed (in 1944) they did that relatively easily. I would say, China's military contribution was hardly comparable even to the effect of a 500,000 Soviet army located in Far East: it was tying down a whole Kwantung Army, which was stronger than the army that was fighting in China mainland.
- It was Roosevelt who regarded China highly, neither Stalin nor Churchill didn't agree with him.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:35, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- To point was that the Cairo Conference dealt with the war with Japan, the Tehran Conference didn't. This is not my interpretation. It is well documented in the Wikipedia article and other sources.[4] Hence, Chiang only went to Cairo, and Stalin only went to Tehran. It was not a matter of hierarchy.--Jack Upland (talk) 05:28, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- If I remember correct, Japan was discussed, but, taking into account that the USSR bore a major brunt of the war against the European Axis, the sides agreed that the USSR would join the war against Japan after Germany would be defeated.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:54, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- In general I support Jack Upland's call for a greater emphasis on China in this article, and a photo of Chiang somewhere is a good way of doing it. I think we could all agree that Wikipedia policy doesn't really care what the 'Big Three' thought of Chiang and China, it cares what our verifiable sources say. Because for the last decade at least there has been a tilt from old Western narratives about who was relevant in the war; e.g. we know from Laurence Rees that for one single American GI or British Tommy who gave his life to the war, 54 Soviets did (and Rees etc also explain that as why D-Day was postponed by a year or even two). Similarly, this generation of historians emphasize that China took the overwhelming majority of bullets in Asia (and over 20 million civilian deaths). According to strategies of bait and bleed, both were by Allied design. With this in mind, use a photo of Chiang. The only question is where. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:09, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- There's already quite a bit on China in the article. I haven't seen any historian of any standing suggest that the Allies were so cynical about China. Instead, they usually argue that if anything too much resources were allocated to the Chinese, and emphasise the lighting-fast nature of the Allied advance through the Pacific from late 1943 (only possible once the necessary shipping had been constructed and troops trained). Nick-D (talk) 06:18, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- In general I support Jack Upland's call for a greater emphasis on China in this article, and a photo of Chiang somewhere is a good way of doing it. I think we could all agree that Wikipedia policy doesn't really care what the 'Big Three' thought of Chiang and China, it cares what our verifiable sources say. Because for the last decade at least there has been a tilt from old Western narratives about who was relevant in the war; e.g. we know from Laurence Rees that for one single American GI or British Tommy who gave his life to the war, 54 Soviets did (and Rees etc also explain that as why D-Day was postponed by a year or even two). Similarly, this generation of historians emphasize that China took the overwhelming majority of bullets in Asia (and over 20 million civilian deaths). According to strategies of bait and bleed, both were by Allied design. With this in mind, use a photo of Chiang. The only question is where. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:09, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- Chumchum7, If the only Soviet achievement were "to take overwhelming majority of bullets", there would be no reason to devote much space to the Eastern Front. I am insisting on giving greater coverage of the Eastern front because the Soviets send overwhelming majority of bullets to the Axis solders (Eastern front killed more than 50% of all Axis military). Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about China. However, I don't mind to add more description of Chinese losses in the section specially dedicated to that subject.
- In addition, if we want to honor Chinese soldiers of civilians, lets show solders and civilians. I doubt Chiang's image (who was a ruthless, murderous and inefficient leader) is the best option.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:26, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- Returning to the topic of this section, I think that the article has way too many dull posed photos of senior politicians. What Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, etc, looked like is pretty well known! (and just a click away when reading Wikipedia articles). Nick-D (talk) 06:35, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- In addition, if we want to honor Chinese soldiers of civilians, lets show solders and civilians. I doubt Chiang's image (who was a ruthless, murderous and inefficient leader) is the best option.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:26, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- Cynicism isn't usually the word used, it's realpolitik. Roosevelt was a well-documented master of the art; take his often-quoted response to HUMINT on the Holocaust, for example. Historians of great standing show that democracies prefer to have their non-democratic allies fight total wars, because they don't win elections by letting their boys get killed. I agree with you that there is content on China in the article, and I'm just saying that in support of Jack Upland, there is room for more. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:51, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- Taking bullets was obviously not the only Soviet achievement, and nobody said it was. The Soviet Union achieved very many things; brilliant generalship, technological advances, civilian resilience, production of materiel, the list goes on. I support the insistence on giving greater coverage to the Eastern Front. Chiang's image would not necessarily glorify him any more than Hirohito's image would glorify Hirohito, nor would it contradict our reflection of verifiable sources on Chiang's ruthless, murderous, inefficient record. If the majority view of sources say there's a paradox between Chinese deaths and Chinese effectiveness, then it can go into the article too. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:51, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- Chumchum7, let me reiterate: In China, Japan reached its "A-A line". And that is the major difference between the Soviet and Chinese contributions in Allied war efforts. Actually, nothing was happening in China after 1941 which was comparable, by strategic implications, to El Alamein or Guadalcanal. If Wehrmacht reached the "A-A line" in 1941 (I assume a hypothetical situation that that hadn't led to immediate collapse of the Grand Alliance), it would be totally incorrect to speak about any significant role Stalin could play during strategic meetings of the Allied leaders. He would be a second rank leader, and that is exactly who Chiang was.
- I agree that suffering and losses of Chinese people should be better explained. However, one has to keep in mind that majority of victims were civilians (and a significant part of them were a result of 1942-3 famine). I do think this question should be described in more details, but in the "Casualties and war crimes" section. And that does serve as an argument to emphasize the role of Chiang.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:28, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
Oxford historian Rana Mitter is an authority on the role of China and the positive peer reception of his Forgotten Ally: China’s War with Japan, 1937-45 (2013) did a lot to revise the mainstream view. That will be a useful source for us at this juncture. In many interviews online, Mitter talks about the book, the addition of Wang Jingwei to Mao and Chiang, Stalin's pragmatic assistance to Chiang, and Chiang's 4 million troops fighting Japan; e.g. here: [5] -Chumchum7 (talk) 05:38, 4 November 2018 (UTC)
- Thanks to the efforts of a few editors, quite a bit on the war in China has been added to the article over the last year or so. I suspect that the extent of this coverage is now greater than in most narratives on the war. If there are specific changes you'd like to propose, please start a new thread to do so. Nick-D (talk) 05:53, 4 November 2018 (UTC)
- (edit conflict)I didn't find any specific facts in her article that support her assertion that Chinese role is underestimated. Obviously, a wast China required enormous resources to maintain control over it, so Japan had to keep significant troops to control conquered territories and protect a frontline. However, in contrast to Germany, Japan's military capabilities were limited not by manpower, but by her technology. The only exception was air forces, but China was not the theater that required a significant number of trained pilots. With regard to the rest, Japanese efforts in Pacific were limited with her capability of deliver troops there, so it would be incorrect to say that the need to keep 1.2 million troops in China had any significant effect on the war in Pacific. In addition, the size of Japanese army in mainland China was comparable with that of Kwantung Army, which was stationed in Manchuria to protect it against a 500,000 Soviet army that was stationed along the Amur river during the whole war. In that sense, the effect of the idle Soviet troops was similar to the effect of whole Chinese army. Even at the very end of the WWII, Japanese troops were not defeated by China, and they surrendered just because they were ordered to do so by Hirohito.
- To summarise, China was the first (future) Ally who started to fight against a future Axis power. The story of the beginning of SSJW has been covered well in the article, and that is correct. Probably, we can tell more about that period. However, after 1941, China was de facto defeated, and all subsequent events in that theatre had only moderate strategic importance. China suffered enormous losses, but it inflicted relatively minor losses on Japan (if I am not wrong, more Japanese military died from diseases than were killed). Therefore, an adequate way to describe China in this article would be a detailed coverage of 1937-41 events and description of civilian and military casualties in the "Casualties" section.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:06, 4 November 2018 (UTC)
- With regard to the discussion about the Tehran Conference above, it's true that Stalin did agree to declare war on Japan after the defeat of Hitler, but Japan didn't know that. If Chiang had gone to Tehran, Japan would surely have known, and it would look like the USSR was violating neutrality.--Jack Upland (talk) 19:45, 8 November 2018 (UTC)
- Stalin attended the conference with the leaders of two major military opponents of Japan: USA and UK. Wasn't it a violation of neutrality? In addition, in 1943, major Japan's concern was to keep the USSR neutral. It would be a nightmare for Japan if the USSR broke neutrality, and Japan would prefer to turn a blind eye on minor violations of neutrality, such as negotiations with Roosevelt and Churchill, and I sincerely don't understand how could Kaishek's presence change the situation. Actually, the very fact that the USSR broke a neutrality pact in August 1945 was a decisive factor that convinced Hirohito to surrender: before that, Japan still hoped Stalin would be a mediator in prospective negotiations with the US about a peace treaty.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:29, 8 November 2018 (UTC)
- Well, then, all the history books are wrong!--Jack Upland (talk) 06:52, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- Maybe, not then books, but your conclusions?--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:40, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- Your statement is based on a false premise. Stalin's attendance at conference with his Allied leaders (vs Germany) was definitely not a violation of his neutrality treaty with Japan. The treaty in no way prohibited such activities. Mediatech492 (talk) 14:55, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- Stalin's meeting with Churchill in 1941 was definitely not a violation, because Britain was not at war with Japan. However, after Pearl Harbor, when the US and Britain were at war with Japan, any meeting where a joint military activity was discussed could be considered as an unfriendly step by Japan. Japan couldn't know what exactly did they discuss (it could never be sure a military activity against Japan was not discussed; actually, it was discussed, as you know). In any event, I don't see why a meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt was in accordance with the Soviet-Japan pact, and a meeting between Kaishek and Stalin was. During a meeting with Roosevelt, Stalin could discuss not the aspects of the war with Germany, but the details of a future attack of Japan (actually, this question was discussed). Similarly, a meeting with Kaishek (had it happened) could be devoted to a Chinese help to the USSR in the war with Germany (that sounds ridiculous, but formally that was possible). Therefore, from a formal point of view, the presence of Kaishek would not be a formal violation of neutrality (not more than meeting with Roosevelt).
- In any event, I am not sure Stalin cared too much about that, because in 1943 it was Japan who was more interested in keeping the USSR neutral. If Stalin did object to invitation of Kaishek, a reference to the neutrality pact was just a formal pretext.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:40, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- Okay, exactly which article of the Treaty was violated by Stalin's meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill? Mediatech492 (talk) 17:09, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- No article was openly violated. And exactly which article of the Treaty was violated by Stalin's meeting with Kaishek?--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:45, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- First of all, Chiang Kai-shek's surname is "Chinag", not "Kaishek". Nobody called him Kai-shek except family and close friends. Referring to him in this informal is disrespectful and shows your lack of knowledge of the basic subject matter. Secondly there is nothing in the the treaty which prohibited Stalin from meeting with Chiang, for any reason. Mediatech492 (talk) 17:57, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- Yes, I made this mistake again. "Chiang" is even easier to write. With regard to disrespect, what about "Uncle Joe"? Going back to the main question, if you agree that a meeting with Chiang was not a violation of the pact, what all this dispute is about?--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:36, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- I never said it was, so why are you pursuing the argument? Mediatech492 (talk) 18:44, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- Because we are discussing the argument that Chiang Kaishek was not invited to Tehran because his meeting with Stalin would be a violation of USSR's neutrality.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:54, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- And you've already received your answer. Move along please. Mediatech492 (talk) 19:07, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- Because we are discussing the argument that Chiang Kaishek was not invited to Tehran because his meeting with Stalin would be a violation of USSR's neutrality.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:54, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- I never said it was, so why are you pursuing the argument? Mediatech492 (talk) 18:44, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- Yes, I made this mistake again. "Chiang" is even easier to write. With regard to disrespect, what about "Uncle Joe"? Going back to the main question, if you agree that a meeting with Chiang was not a violation of the pact, what all this dispute is about?--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:36, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- First of all, Chiang Kai-shek's surname is "Chinag", not "Kaishek". Nobody called him Kai-shek except family and close friends. Referring to him in this informal is disrespectful and shows your lack of knowledge of the basic subject matter. Secondly there is nothing in the the treaty which prohibited Stalin from meeting with Chiang, for any reason. Mediatech492 (talk) 17:57, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- No article was openly violated. And exactly which article of the Treaty was violated by Stalin's meeting with Kaishek?--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:45, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- Okay, exactly which article of the Treaty was violated by Stalin's meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill? Mediatech492 (talk) 17:09, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- Well, then, all the history books are wrong!--Jack Upland (talk) 06:52, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
- Stalin attended the conference with the leaders of two major military opponents of Japan: USA and UK. Wasn't it a violation of neutrality? In addition, in 1943, major Japan's concern was to keep the USSR neutral. It would be a nightmare for Japan if the USSR broke neutrality, and Japan would prefer to turn a blind eye on minor violations of neutrality, such as negotiations with Roosevelt and Churchill, and I sincerely don't understand how could Kaishek's presence change the situation. Actually, the very fact that the USSR broke a neutrality pact in August 1945 was a decisive factor that convinced Hirohito to surrender: before that, Japan still hoped Stalin would be a mediator in prospective negotiations with the US about a peace treaty.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:29, 8 November 2018 (UTC)
- With regard to the discussion about the Tehran Conference above, it's true that Stalin did agree to declare war on Japan after the defeat of Hitler, but Japan didn't know that. If Chiang had gone to Tehran, Japan would surely have known, and it would look like the USSR was violating neutrality.--Jack Upland (talk) 19:45, 8 November 2018 (UTC)
Ok, I removed the Cairo image as redundant. I also propose to think about Casablanca: this was a meeting between just two Allied leaders, and no important agreements were achieved there.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:40, 9 November 2018 (UTC)
Semi-protected edit request on 10 November 2018
The use of Indigenous languages also became a technological device as part of Canada's and US's communications. Indigenous members of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps developed for transmitting vital messages in WW2. Know as "code talkers", their role was similar to the American First Nations who spoke Navajo and were know as “Windtalkers”. [7] JIllPrice (talk) 16:46, 10 November 2018 (UTC)
- Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. DannyS712 (talk) 16:57, 10 November 2018 (UTC)
- Negative. this is a very minor topic that is covered in separate articles and is not useful here. Rjensen (talk) 19:04, 10 November 2018 (UTC)
The spy war?
Seems to be an omission in such a comprehensive article that goes into so much detail on other topics. Code-breaking gets a passing mention as part of the 'Technology' section but afaics there's nothing on e.g. the Double-Cross System and Operation Scherhorn, etc. I hereby call for a dedicated section, and invite drafting below for discussion. -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:45, 29 October 2018 (UTC)
- That seems rather undue. Modern historians generally argue that almost all the intelligence operations other than code-breaking (on all sides) had pretty minor results. The various spy rings, etc, rarely produced results - the only one which springs to mind as being truly influential is the Soviet penetration of the Allied nuclear program, and even that didn't pay off until after the war. These efforts also didn't involve many people or resources. That said, what text are you proposing? Nick-D (talk) 10:51, 29 October 2018 (UTC)
- Thank you very much for the reply. With a view to the text, you concur that code-breaking did not have minor results, so we could start by folding that out into a dedicated section: Cryptanalysis of the Lorenz cipher was instrumental in the Battle of Kursk, Ultra was vital to the Battle of the Atlantic; the Battle of Arnhem failed in large part because commanders ignored SIGINT (as well as HUMINT from Dutch spies) on enemy positions. On the subject of spy rings, etc, D-Day was dependent on a deception operation named Operation Fortitude involving the double-agent Duško Popov, some say Soviet spy Richard Sorge personally enabled the Red Army to free up 18 divisions from the Far East for the Battle of Moscow, and the list goes on. But more importantly, the threshold for inclusion is not what we think historians agree about causality (and it's really debatable whether historians generally agree spies were irrelevant) but verifiability. The amount of sourcing on WWII espionage is vast, which also adds WP:NOTABILITY. Isn't Wikipedia meant to be a reflection of the available literature, rather than a reflection of a thesis about cause and effect? This is the tip of the iceberg, including both SIGINT and HUMINT:
Author(s) | Title | Publisher | Date | Notes |
Babington-Smith, Constance | Air Spy: The Story of Photo Intelligence in World War II | — | 1957 | — |
Berg, Moe | The Catcher Was a Spy: The Mysterious Life of Moe Berg | Vintage Books | 1994 | — Major league baseball player and OSS Secret Intelligence (SI) spy in Yugoslavia |
Bryden, John | Best-Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War | Lester | 1993 | — |
Doundoulakis, Helias | Trained to be an OSS Spy | Xlibris | 2014 | OSS Secret Intelligence (SI) spy in Greece |
Hall, Virginia | The Spy with the Wooden Leg: The Story of Virginia Hall | Alma Little | 2012 | SOE and OSS spy in France |
Hinsley, F. H. and Alan Stripp | Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park | — | 2001 | — |
Hinsley, F. H. | British Intelligence in the Second World War | — | 1996 | Abridged version of multivolume official history. |
Hohne, Heinz | Canaris: Hitler's Master Spy | — | 1979 | — |
Jones, R. V. | The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–1945 | — | 1978 | — |
Kahn, David | Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II | — | 1978 | — |
Kahn, David | Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes, 1939–1943 | — | 1991 | FACE |
Kitson, Simon | The Hunt for Nazi Spies: Fighting Espionage in Vichy France | — | 2008 | |
Leigh Fermor, Patrick | Abducting a General: The Kreipe Operation in Crete | New York Review Books | 2015 | SOE spy who abducted General Kreipe from Crete |
Lewin, Ronald | The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan | — | 1982 | — |
Masterman, J. C. | The Double Cross System in the War of 1935 to 1945 | Yale | 1972 | — |
Persico, Joseph | Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage | — | 2001 | — |
Persico, Joseph | Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey-From the OSS to the CIA | — | 1991 | — |
Pinck, Dan | Journey to Peking: A Secret Agent in Wartime China | US Naval Institute Press | 2003 | OSS Secret Intelligence (SI) spy in Hong Kong, China, during WWII |
Ronnie, Art | Counterfeit Hero: Fritz Duquesne, Adventurer and Spy | — | 1995 | ISBN 1-55750-733-3 |
Sayers, Michael & Albert E. Kahn | Sabotage! The Secret War Against America | — | 1942 | — |
Smith, Richard Harris | OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency | — | 2005 | — |
Stanley, Roy M. | World War II Photo Intelligence | — | 1981 | — |
Wark, Wesley | The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939 | — | 1985 | — |
Wark, Wesley | "Cryptographic Innocence: The Origins of Signals Intelligence in Canada in the Second World War" in Journal of Contemporary History 22 | — | 1987 | — |
West, Nigel | Secret War: The Story of SOE, Britain's Wartime Sabotage Organization | — | 1992 | — |
Winterbotham, F. W. | The Ultra Secret | Harper & Row | 1974 | — |
Winterbotham, F. W. | The Nazi Connection | Harper & Row | 1978 | — |
Cowburn, B. | No Cloak No Dagger | Brown, Watson, Ltd. | 1960 | — |
Wohlstetter, Roberta | Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision | — | 1962 | — |
Thanks -Chumchum7 (talk) 05:04, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
- In addition I would recommend Max Hastings 2015 work, The Secret War: Spies, Codes And Guerrillas, 1939–45. London: William Collins, 2015. ISBN 9780007503742, an excellent, detailed overview of the effects of espionage in WW2 Simon Adler (talk) 05:12, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
- Yes, it's a great point to include the clear overlap between field agents, code-breakers and the resistance war. To the latter can be added NKVD, OSS and SOE (particularly effective in Yugoslavia and Greece) and the mass of sabotage (as well as intelligence) against Germany provided by cells among the millions of slave labourers dragging down the Nazi war machine from the inside. Per The Last Battle by Cornelius Ryan, the Untermensch ensured plenty of German tanks were already malfunctioning when they reached the Eastern Front. -Chumchum7 (talk) 05:37, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
- In addition I would recommend Max Hastings 2015 work, The Secret War: Spies, Codes And Guerrillas, 1939–45. London: William Collins, 2015. ISBN 9780007503742, an excellent, detailed overview of the effects of espionage in WW2 Simon Adler (talk) 05:12, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
- I think the question remains what text do you want to add to the article? As it stands, there is more about espionage than about the development of the atomic bomb. Many things happened in WW2, and they are all clamouring for attention. The main organising concept is the narrative, and the main criteria for inclusion seems to be the effect on the outcome of the war (see discussion at the start of the section). I think this is problematic, but there it is.--Jack Upland (talk) 07:35, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
Well, in the name of consensus I'd hoped we could all chip in for content, but I'm happy to start the brainstorm if that's what you want. Here's a start:
====The intelligence war====
Cryptography and SIGINT was used extensively during World War II, with a plethora of code and cipher systems fielded by the nations involved. The break into the most secure Japanese diplomatic cipher, designated "PURPLE" by the US Army Signals Intelligence Service, started before the US entered the war. Product from this source was called Magic; the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, General Hiroshi Ōshima, routinely sent information about German plans to Tokyo which was immediately read by Roosevelt and Churchill. Decryption by the Allies of the German "Enigma" Cipher created product named Ultra. The first complete break into Enigma was accomplished in 1932 by the Poles, who passed their technology and methodology to the French and British in July 1939, and evacuated their team of code-breakers at the start of the war to continue their work. Ultra contributed to many Allied victories, including the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of Kursk.
Churchill's order to "set Europe ablaze" was undertaken by the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), which developed a plan to train HUMINT spies, guerrillas and saboteurs for deployment in occupied Europe; eventually, this would become the Special Operations Executive. America had no overarching military intelligence agency until Roosevelt, inspired by the British, started the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) which in 1942 became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which after the war became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[1][2] The Soviet NKVD had been well-established for many years before the war, and its staff were Stalin's most trusted personnel; agents included Richard Sorge, who accurately reported that Japan had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union in 1941, and double-agent Kim Philby, a senior SIS officer with access to most of Britain's intelligence reports. NKVD operatives were also crucial to partisan warfare and the establishment of Soviet power in Eastern Europe toward the end of the war.
-Chumchum7 (talk) 16:33, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
- What about Red Orchestra and Leopold Trepper?--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:30, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
"The Soviet NKVD had been well-established for many years before the war"
This seems to be an exaggeration. The NKVD was active from 1934 to 1946. The previous secret police was the Joint State Political Directorate (1923-1934), which was itself preceded by the State Political Directorate (1922-1923), the Cheka (1917-1922), the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee (1917), and the Okhrana (1881-1917). Dimadick (talk) 19:08, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
- 1934 is seven years before the Soviets entered the war, which is plenty of time for them to establish themselves. Also, the NKVD did have a previous incarnation from 1917 to 1930; so when it was re-established it came with a cadre of experienced men. Furthermore this later incarnation also incorporated the previously separate OGPU and all its men and resources, which included more than a few former Cheka men. The NKVD was not a novice bunch in 1934, and by 1941 it was very well established. Mediatech492 (talk) 20:31, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
- "1934 is seven years before the Soviets entered the war" Five years. The Soviet invasion of Poland took place in 1939. Dimadick (talk) 21:49, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
- I'm not going to argue petty semantics. Russia officially entered the war in 1941. Mediatech492 (talk) 23:14, 30 October 2018 (UTC)
So at least three options:
(i) "The Soviet NKVD had been well-established before the war"
(ii) "The Soviet NKVD had been well-established before the war, and was preceded by the Joint State Political Directorate (1923-1934), which was itself preceded by the State Political Directorate (1922-1923), the Cheka (1917-1922), the Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee (1917), and the Okhrana (1881-1917)
(iii) "The Soviet NKVD was the culmination of many years of the absolute power of the Russian state, which had masterfully pioneered tactics such as "maskirovka", "spetsoperatsiya", false flag, "aktivniyye meropriyatiya", "kompromat", "provokatsiya" and "mokroye delo". Run by Stalin's right-hand-man Lavrentiy Beria, it was not just the USSR's primary intelligence organization, but also the Interior Ministry of the Soviet Union, with a monopoly on law enforcement (when it merged with the secret police OGPU in 1934), operation of the Gulags, political repression including extrajudicial mass killings of perceived and real enemies, cooperation with the Gestapo and Denazification; during the war it took its methods abroad and even had its own front-line divisions.
-Chumchum7 (talk) 05:19, 31 October 2018 (UTC)
I don't support the proposed text at all. It's focused on various individuals, when the intelligence war was conducted on an industrial scale. The text also makes no mention of the Axis intelligence efforts (which were quite successful until about 1943) and their attempts at sabotage campaigns (which were total failures). Nick-D (talk) 07:24, 31 October 2018 (UTC)
- That's why I've said that is just a start to the brainstorm, and have asked for us all to chip in, in the name of consensus. What text do you propose? -Chumchum7 (talk) 07:45, 31 October 2018 (UTC)
"Axis intelligence efforts" You can find some material on the Gestapo (secret police), the Foreign Armies East (military intelligence organization), the Sicherheitsdienst (intelligence agency of the SS), the Abwehr (Wehrmacht military intelligence), the Geheime Feldpolizei (Wehrmacht secret police), and the Sicherheitspolizei (security police) on their respective articles. We also have an incomplete List of German spies, divided by period. Dimadick (talk) 08:29, 31 October 2018 (UTC)
- German Radio Intelligence Operations during World War II covers what was by far the most effective element of the German intelligence efforts (though it doesn't yet seem to cover the German successes in breaking convoy codes during the Battle of the Atlantic). Their human intelligence campaign was a small-scale fiasco for most of the war. Nick-D (talk) 09:30, 31 October 2018 (UTC)
- Indeed it's worth including just how incompetent Germany was at HUMINT: the Ubermensch isn't very good at making friends. -Chumchum7 (talk) 10:35, 31 October 2018 (UTC)
- Nick-D are you going to make a contribution to reaching consensus here, for example by proposing an alternative to the content you objected to? For what it's worth I see see no policy or guideline infringement by mentioning a few individuals in a total war. Conceptually, every description of a subject uses examples of its details, e.g. a description of a human body could mention a freckle and a description of a metropolis could mention a street corner. But with your objection in mind, here's another go:
- Cryptography and SIGINT was used extensively during World War II, with a plethora of code and cipher systems fielded by the nations involved. The break into the most secure Japanese diplomatic cipher, designated "PURPLE" by the US Army Signals Intelligence Service, started before the US entered the war. Product from this source was called Magic; the Japanese routinely sent information about German plans to Tokyo which was immediately read by Western Allied leadership. Their decryption of the German "Enigma" Cipher created product named Ultra. The first complete break into Enigma was accomplished in 1932 by the Poles, who passed their technology and methodology to the French and British in July 1939, and evacuated the Polish Cipher Bureau at the start of the war to continue its work. Ultra contributed to many Allied victories, including the Battle of the Atlantic and the Battle of Kursk.
- The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) trained HUMINT spies, guerrillas and saboteurs for deployment in occupied Europe; eventually, this would become the Special Operations Executive. America had no overarching military intelligence agency until - inspired by the British - it started the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) which in 1942 became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which after the war became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[1][2] The Soviet NKVD had been well-established before the war, and its staff were Stalin's most trusted personnel; it accurately established that Japan had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union in 1941, and used double-agents to access Britain's intelligence reports. The NKVD was also crucial to partisan warfare and the establishment of Soviet power in Eastern Europe toward the end of the war.
- We could treat this as a minimum basis or stub, and add further detail depending what the consensus is on the amount of space to allocate to this section. -Chumchum7 (talk) 13:06, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- I can suggest something, but it will take time to research and write. Nick-D (talk) 21:09, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- If there are no objections from other editors, I will add the content to the article with the understanding that at some stage Nick-D will be getting round to editing the section further. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:15, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- What's the rush? The above material remains deeply flawed: it doesn't capture the scale of the SIGINT efforts, most of the material is not sourced, and there's nothing about the Axis intelligence efforts. I'm not sure what you're hoping to achieve with snide comments? Nick-D (talk) 06:23, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- Woah. Snide? -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:55, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- Nick-D, I totally refute this allegation. I am working to consensus, using the Talk page before editing, have responded to a request for content, have offered compromise content and have invited others to chime in; I have also assisted you below on a point of accuracy with the matter of civilian deaths in Tokyo and Hiroshima. I apologize if in doing so I inadvertently hurt your feelings. As it stands you have made a false assumption about my comments. In so doing you have used uncivil language, not in keeping with the standards of our community. This is no example to be set for others. Per WP:IDENTIFYUNCIVIL, please strike through the sentence containing the word "snide", and that should be the end of it. We all make mistakes, tone can easily be misinterpreted on the internet, and you are hereby forgiven. So far, nobody else has stepped forward to object to the proposed content, so if you want WP:CONS to wait for you, please be kind enough to let us know within what time-frame you're going to come up with the content you'd prefer. Many thanks, -Chumchum7 (talk) 11:22, 4 November 2018 (UTC)
- No-one else has actually supported the inclusion of the material you've proposed, or even having a dedicated section on this topic, so there is obviously not grounds to include this. Nick-D (talk) 08:11, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
- Nick-D, you've ignored my request to please strike out the line containing the word "snide". You have said that you are going to prepare alternative content, and have ignored my request to let me know when you are going to do so. Instead have now said that there is no grounds to include this, though it's not clear whether you are referring to the section in general or just my proposal specifically. On grounds for inclusion, we clearly have different views on the way WP:CONS works. From my perspective I've been patient and consultative. I've tried to clear up a misunderstanding. I've apologized. I'm asking you one more time to be a good sport and strike out the line. There are standards at stake here. If you continue you to ignore my request, I will reluctantly put it on the record for discussion at the relevant noticeboards. I have not been snide, and we all have an obligation to assume good faith. -Chumchum7 (talk) 12:07, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
- Stuff like "at some stage Nick-D will be getting round to editing the section further" isn't exactly polite... Nick-D (talk) 09:19, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
- No-one else has actually supported the inclusion of the material you've proposed, or even having a dedicated section on this topic, so there is obviously not grounds to include this. Nick-D (talk) 08:11, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
- What's the rush? The above material remains deeply flawed: it doesn't capture the scale of the SIGINT efforts, most of the material is not sourced, and there's nothing about the Axis intelligence efforts. I'm not sure what you're hoping to achieve with snide comments? Nick-D (talk) 06:23, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- If there are no objections from other editors, I will add the content to the article with the understanding that at some stage Nick-D will be getting round to editing the section further. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:15, 3 November 2018 (UTC)
- I can suggest something, but it will take time to research and write. Nick-D (talk) 21:09, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
- We could treat this as a minimum basis or stub, and add further detail depending what the consensus is on the amount of space to allocate to this section. -Chumchum7 (talk) 13:06, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
Nick-D, I hope you're well. I'm keeping my word, and bringing this issue to conclusion. It's been over one week since you said you need time to go and research and write your preferred text. I have held back from editing the article out of respect for that. During this time you have not responded to my request for an indication of when you you are going to get back with said text. During this time you have not striked through the sentence in which you alleged I was "snide". I've explained above that this was a misinterpretation, and that Wikipedia standards are at stake. We are all bound by WP:AGF and WP:CIVIL. You are further bound by WP:ADMINCOND and WP:ADMINACCT, etc. I am not going to strike out your line myself, out of respect for boundaries. With the absence of a civility noticeboard at this time there are very few options left other than requesting the involvement of other administrators. Per WP:BOOMERANG I would invite scrutiny of my own conduct. The request would include the information that you have made the 2nd biggest number of edits on this article [6] and have been editing this article for 12 years and 457 edits, which were mostly deletions of content, the majority of which in the last three years were hard reverts [7]. This is evidence of your great work; it might also have become significant with regard to your stance here. I say this to give you a friendly and collegial explanation and notice for my next step before I take it. That will be within the next 24 hours or so. I still hope that before then you will be able to strike through the line, in order to maintain Wikipedia standards. I would be most grateful, and would look forward to continuing to support your work in the future. -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:29, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- If it's helpful, the reasons I haven't proposed any text here are 1) no other editor supports adding a section on this topic 2) I don't want to engage with you given your conduct such as that in the post above and elsewhere 3) I'm a volunteer here (like everyone else) and can write on whatever topics I please. Regards, Nick-D (talk) 10:38, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
Allies close in (1944)
I removed the mention of 200k civilians killed in Warsaw, because we do not provide this type figures in the Course of the War section. Should we add this information to the War crimes section?
The only serious problem that I see in this section is the image from Warsaw uprising. This event (more precisely, the behaviour of Soviet leadership) had long lasting political consequences, but its strategic implications were minimal. The second important battle in 1944 in terms of political effect (and the first important in terms of German military losses) was Bagration. Therefore, it would be correct to replace Dirlewanger's photo with one of Bagration photos. 1944 was the year of four major Soviet offensives where Germany sustained immense losses. The images do not reflect that fact.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:08, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- The 200,000 number should be removed, our rationale for no death counts having reached consensus for this article. It should be added to War Crimes as it was part of the Nuremberg Trials. However Operation Bagration should not be emphasized over the Warsaw Uprising per se for a number of reasons. (i) Emphasis and notability among sources. One example of many: Britannica has the Warsaw Uprising, but not Operation Bagration. [8] (ii) Categorization. There's no doubt that Soviet action on the Eastern Front was the most important factor in the defeat of Nazi Germany, and that should receive due weight in this article with it being made clear that engagements such as e.g. the Second Battle of El Alamein were tiny by comparison; but Bagration was just one aspect of several parts of this titanic front rather than a separate subject. (iii) Sources don't actually say the uprising was strategically insignificant. They say it was one of the perceivable causes of the Battle of Romania, with the Eastern front halting in Poland in response to the obstacle of the (perceivably anti-Soviet) uprising, after which Soviet forces could swing south to protect their flank and seize the Ploiesti oilfields while Germany did the job of suppressing Warsaw and killing most of the Polish resistance, which had already embarked on a guerrilla war against the Soviets. Straightforward military-political realism. Note the advances in blue on this map [9] coincide with the strategic halt outside Warsaw. (iv) Some sources say the Warsaw Uprising is one of the places, if not the place, where the Cold War percievably started, in which case it has huge significance. The point being that Poland was a British and American Ally and an Allied liberation of its own capital was cut off by the nearby Soviets (in contrast with the French liberation of Paris facilitated by the Americans), with a view to postwar political realities. It's verifiable that prompted by the Soviet strategic halt, Australian, British, Canadian, New Zealand, Polish and South African airmen undertook over 200 resupply flights from the heel of Italy and were denied Soviet landing rights 5 minute's flying time from Warsaw; damaged Western Allied planes attempting to land due to German AA fire were attacked by the Soviets, the sources show. Historians tend to treat that as highly significant. (v) As to Oskar Dirlewanger himself, what he did against the Warsaw Uprising is verifiably one of the most notorious examples of Germany's sadism in the war. For Wikipedia purposes, that is not less significant than the causal factors in the defeat of Germany, it's an important part of comprehensive coverage of the subject of WWII. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:03, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- As I said, Warsaw uprising had serious political implications, and it, along with Katyn, poisoned relationships between the two countries. That is why it is important, and that is why it has a separate article in Britannica. However, its contribution to Allied war efforts was minimal. In contrats, Bagration was the most calamitous defeat of German army (and the Axis as whole) during the whole WWII. In addition to Bagration, there were three other major offensives in the East, and they had enormous effect on the course of the war. The photo must reflect the fact that 1944 was the year of a series of massive offensives in the East. The Dirlewanger's photo does not serve this goal. However, I think this photo can be preserved in the article, but it is more relevant to the "War crimes" section. In general, taking into account that more civilians were killed in this war than military, we definitely have to expand the war crimes section significantly.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:29, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- This boils down to whether Wikipedia article content is determined by causality or notability. For what it's worth, I believe it's the latter; more importantly, we defer to consensus. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:38, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- As I said, Warsaw uprising had serious political implications, and it, along with Katyn, poisoned relationships between the two countries. That is why it is important, and that is why it has a separate article in Britannica. However, its contribution to Allied war efforts was minimal. In contrats, Bagration was the most calamitous defeat of German army (and the Axis as whole) during the whole WWII. In addition to Bagration, there were three other major offensives in the East, and they had enormous effect on the course of the war. The photo must reflect the fact that 1944 was the year of a series of massive offensives in the East. The Dirlewanger's photo does not serve this goal. However, I think this photo can be preserved in the article, but it is more relevant to the "War crimes" section. In general, taking into account that more civilians were killed in this war than military, we definitely have to expand the war crimes section significantly.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:29, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- I disagree. Bagration resulted in a fast advance of Red Army and eventually to the capture of Berlin by Soviet troops. Had the 1944 been less successful for the Soviets, it is quite likely that the war would have ended later, Berlin would be captured by Western Allies, who sustained much greater casualties, and most central European country would be occupied not by the USSR, but by Britain and the US. The whole European history of XX century would be different without Bagration. In contrast, the only consequence of Warsaw uprising was that Poland has more reasons to hate Russia. What else?
- I stand by the rationale above. That's all from me and I defer to consensus. -Chumchum7 (talk) 13:47, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- That means you don't understand what consensus means. It is marked by addressing legitimate concerns held by editors through a process of compromise while following Wikipedia policies. I think I was able to explain you my vision of notability, however, I don't see how have you addressed my legitimate concern.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:57, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- Re "...with the Eastern front halting in Poland in response to the obstacle of the (perceivably anti-Soviet) uprising..." That is a very odd interpretation. Whereas it sounds logical that Stalin could provide more support to the uprising (except allowing berlingowcy to cross Vistula and join the uprising), one has to keep in mind that the Red Army was desperately exhausted, and it was incapable to advance further without reinforcements. No evidences exist that Stavka delayed Vistula-Oder operation in responce to the Warsaw uprising. In contrast, existing sources say Red Army was not prepared for any significant offencive in this region during that time.
- Actually, you are shifting the emphasis from my major point (1944 was a year when Red Army was extremely successful, and its four major offensives essentially destroyed Wehrmacht and shaped the political situation in Europe, and this fact should be reflected by adding the relevant photo.) to the question if Bagration was more imprtant than Warsaw. I am not sure that type argumentation is correct.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:47, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
Sources
Frequently in discussions here, people have referred to the latest revisionist historians as the ultimate authority, and discounted older historians, and popular perceptions. I think this is a flawed approach. If this article was written entirely based on the latest revisionists, it would present a view of the war that no one holds and that would be unrecognizable to vast majority of readers. We should present a consensus view of the war and acknowledge different viewpoints.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:04, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
- Is this currently a problem with the article text? The article obviously needs to be current with the scholarship on the war, which is evolving quite rapidly. Some of what are widely considered the best books on the war have appeared in recent years (for instance, Adam Tooze's 2006 book The Wages of Destruction is generally considered the best work on Nazi Germany's war economy). Some works which used to be considered standard are now at rather dated (The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich for instance, or the many books which presented a sympathetic account of Nazi generals who are now generally considered major war criminals). Works like the Oxford Companion to World War II and Gerhard L. Weinberg's A World at Arms are my go-tos: they're pretty much up to date, and wide-ranging. As a feature of modern scholarship on the war is to more fully recognise its extent, new and well-reviewed works should be drawn on to ensure that the article is appropriately comprehensive. Nick-D (talk) 09:35, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
"Frequently in discussions here, people have referred to the latest revisionist historians as the ultimate authority, and discounted older historians"
That should not be "frequently", that should be "always". It is one of the most important content guidelines in Wikipedia, included in Wikipedia:Identifying reliable sources:
- "Age matters:
- "Especially in scientific and academic fields, older sources may be inaccurate because new information has been brought to light, new theories proposed, or vocabulary changed. In areas like politics or fashion, laws or trends may make older claims incorrect. Be sure to check that older sources have not been superseded, especially if it is likely the new discoveries or developments have occurred in the last few years. In particular, newer sources are generally preferred in medicine."
- "Sometimes sources are too new to use, such as with breaking news (where later reports might be more accurate), and primary sources which purport to debunk a long-standing consensus or introduce a new discovery (in which case awaiting studies that attempt to replicate the discovery might be a good idea, or reviews that validate the methods used to make the discovery)."
- "With regard to historical events, older reports (closer to the event, but not too close such that they are prone to the errors of breaking news) tend to have the most detail, and are less likely to have errors introduced by repeated copying and summarizing. However, newer secondary and tertiary sources may have done a better job of collecting more reports from primary sources and resolving conflicts, applying modern knowledge to correctly explain things that older sources could not have, or remaining free of bias that might affect sources written while any conflicts described were still active or strongly felt."
We need more historical revisionism, not less. Dimadick (talk) 10:10, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
- Jack Upland&Dimadick, I disagree with you both. There should be no general rule in that case. The very term "historical revisionism" is vague: overwhelming majority of old historians were considered revisionists at the beginning of their career. I think, decisions should be make for each case separately. For example, the German war efforts is a pretty well studied subject so it is quite likely that any new revisionist author who writes about that should be treated with cautions. In contrast, in some other fields, more reasons exit to expect a breakthrough. Thus, a major breakthrough occurred when the USSR dissolved, and a large number of data became available. That means the books written about the USSR that were published in 2000s are more preferable in this article than older monographs or papers. Probably, the same can be said about China, although it is still remaining a closed society, so we may expect good revisionist studies of China in close future.
- In connection to that, Jack, what exactly are you concerned about? Which revisionist sources did you have in mind when you were writing your post? --Paul Siebert (talk) 16:50, 5 November 2018 (UTC)
- It has mainly come up in discussion of weight. For example, Stalingrad. Perhaps the latest revisionist historians consider it to be a mere skirmish etc, but the fact that people at the time considered it was important needs to be taken into account. I think editors should be more broad-minded.--Jack Upland (talk) 07:17, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
"Stalingrad. Perhaps the latest revisionist historians consider it to be a mere skirmish"
The Battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943)? What kind of "skirmish" lasts for 5 months and has 2 million people as casualties? Dimadick (talk) 07:42, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
- Yes indeed, who thinks Stalingrad was a skirmish? Presumably that was irony to illustrate the point. The irony can be put to good use here because it serves to show that whether the case of Stalingrad being called a skirmish would be revisionist or not, more importantly it would be WP:FRINGE. Thus one needs to distinguish between (i) revisionism that is well-received by peers in the field (if not popular consciousness) and therefore adjusts the majority view or instigates a polar debate and further research, and (ii) revisionist fringe theories that are contested by peers in the field and thereby strengthen the existing academic consensus (if not popular consciousness) such as the notorious David Irving. It has been rightly said above that most established historians could have been considered revisionist at some stage, and there is important revisionism underway in recent scholarship as professionals make it their job to obtain fresh evidence which support fresh perspectives. -Chumchum7 (talk) 08:17, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
- Yes, I was trying to illustrate the point. A real example that has occurred is with the nuclear bombs. Paul Siebert pointed out that some historians do not think the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings won the war. I tend to agree, but this is not the only issue. There are many people that think they did. I think there needs to be a balanced representation.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:35, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
- Is a problem with the article text you'd like to see addressed? When WP:FRINGE stuff has found its way into the article, it's usually removed once it's called out (BTW, which historians argue that Stalingrad was a skirmish?! - I'll take them off my to-read list). Nick-D (talk) 09:21, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
- Jack Upland, your example is correct, but it is totally artificial. What real problem with sources do you see in the article?--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:24, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
- Yes, I was trying to illustrate the point. A real example that has occurred is with the nuclear bombs. Paul Siebert pointed out that some historians do not think the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings won the war. I tend to agree, but this is not the only issue. There are many people that think they did. I think there needs to be a balanced representation.--Jack Upland (talk) 08:35, 6 November 2018 (UTC)
- I was talking about a trend, not a particular example.--Jack Upland (talk) 07:34, 7 November 2018 (UTC)
- If such trend exists, you will be able to show concrete examples (e.g., undue weight is given to a revisionist source X, a mainstream source Y is underrepresented).--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:08, 7 November 2018 (UTC)
- I think I've said all I want to say on this topic.--Jack Upland (talk) 07:43, 8 November 2018 (UTC)
- If such trend exists, you will be able to show concrete examples (e.g., undue weight is given to a revisionist source X, a mainstream source Y is underrepresented).--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:08, 7 November 2018 (UTC)
- I was talking about a trend, not a particular example.--Jack Upland (talk) 07:34, 7 November 2018 (UTC)
Jack Upland, you write (regarding the atomic bomb): "... some historians do not think the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings won the war. I tend to agree, but this is not the only issue. There are many people that think they did. I think there needs to be a balanced representation." This is a very interesting question: should Wikipedia translate the common popular views, myths and misconceptions, or it should rely on expert's opinion? In my opinion, if peer-reviewed sources are available on some subject, we should write what they say, and we can ignore popular books, newspaper articles and films. That is especially relevant to WWII, because a new mythology is gradually forming about it, so American historians had to organise round tables to discuss what to do with that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:42, 10 November 2018 (UTC)
- Historians all agree the war was already decisively won when the bombs were dropped. the issue was whether the Japanese would surrender or fight an invasion & retreat to the mountains and fight on for years. Rjensen (talk) 23:00, 10 November 2018 (UTC)
- Correct. However, one must separate the factors that lead to a decisive defeat from the factors that triggered a decision about unconditional surrender. A popular belief is that it was an atomic bomb, but scholarly sources disagree. Should we reproduce popular beliefs, or we should say what real experts think on that account?--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:36, 10 November 2018 (UTC)
- not sure where one discovers "popular beliefs" -- Historians disagree on how important bombs were in forcing the surrender (versus role of Russia). We can document that disagreement. Rjensen (talk) 04:46, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- Correct. However, one must separate the factors that lead to a decisive defeat from the factors that triggered a decision about unconditional surrender. A popular belief is that it was an atomic bomb, but scholarly sources disagree. Should we reproduce popular beliefs, or we should say what real experts think on that account?--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:36, 10 November 2018 (UTC)
- Historians all agree the war was already decisively won when the bombs were dropped. the issue was whether the Japanese would surrender or fight an invasion & retreat to the mountains and fight on for years. Rjensen (talk) 23:00, 10 November 2018 (UTC)
- Are there any serious debates about this subject? When I am searching for modern sources, I find Pape, or Wilson ("Did the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki force the Japanese to surrender in 1945? Did nuclear weapons, in effect, win the war in the Pacific? These questions matter because almost all thinking about nuclear war and nuclear weapons depends, in one way or another, on judgments about the effect of these attacks.Scholarship about Japan’s decision to surrender can be divided into three phases. During the first twenty years after Hiroshima, historians and strategists rarely questioned the necessity of using the atomic bomb or the decisive role it played in bringing World War II to a close. In 1965, however, a revisionist school began examining the decision to use the bomb more closely, raising moral questions about the use of nuclear weapons and asking probing questions about the motives of U.S. leaders. They continued to believe, however,that the bomb was instrumental in ending the war. Since 1990 new scholarship, including recently declassified documents and extensive research into Japanese, Soviet, and U.S. archives, has led to new interpretations of Japan’s surrender. New questions have been raised about the centrality of nuclear weapons in coercing Japan to end the war. In particular, analysis of the strategic situation from a Japanese perspective has led some scholars to assert that the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific war may have been as important or even more important in coercing Japan’s leaders." International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 162–179), or similar sources. Clearly, after 1990s, a consensus is that atomic bombing was less important than Americans believed previously. BTW, Wilson himself goes even further in his views on the role of the atomic weapon.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:41, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- Per WP:NOTTRUTH, WP:NPOV and WP:NOTABILITY this is actually very simple. Sources say that the Soviet entry into the war against Japan and the American bombing campaign including the use of nuclear weapons brought the war to an end. -Chumchum7 (talk) 07:32, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- Wilson (2007) states the issue very well: "In the spring of 1945, Japan was already largely defeated and Japan’s leaders knew it. They hoped, however, to win better terms than simple surrender through diplomacy or battle." So the issue is not "winning" or "defeat" it's deciding why Japan decided to surrender then and not sooner or later. Rjensen (talk) 14:10, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- Per WP:NOTTRUTH, WP:NPOV and WP:NOTABILITY this is actually very simple. Sources say that the Soviet entry into the war against Japan and the American bombing campaign including the use of nuclear weapons brought the war to an end. -Chumchum7 (talk) 07:32, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- Correct. Japan was essentially defeated by mid 1945, and that was achieved by conventional warfare in Pacific. Atomic bombing hadn't added too much to that. Japanese military were not impressed with conventional or atomic bombing of cities, partially because their main base in Manchuria was still pretty safe, and because Korea still had a significant industrial and military potential. However, when the USSR broke a neutrality pact, and Kwantung army demonstrated poor fighting capabilities, the position of the war party in Japanese establishment had been shaken, and they agreed to surrender unconditionally.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:33, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
- with the abomb the Army could no longer protect the Emperor in Tokyo--he had to leave (for the mountains) or surrender. Leaving meant he could no longer rule, and surrender meant that he could rule. He made the decision. USSR invasion did not involve a similar threat to the emperor. Rjensen (talk) 01:32, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- Incorrect. The Japanese leadership still believed they could move the Emperor and his government to Korea or Manchuria, it was a wast territory with a strong economic potential, which was not affected by war. Soviet invasion deprived them of that opportunity, but atomic bombing did not prevent that. Second, had you been familiar with the subject, you would have known that the main reason for Japanese refusal to surrender was that Americans disagreed to preserve imperial institutions, which means there were absolutely no reason to expect the Emperor would continue to rule. --Paul Siebert (talk) 02:04, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- no--the Japanese leadership was hopelessly deadlocked. Stephen S. Larg states re the abombs: together with Russia’s subsequent entry into the war against Japan, politically they created, albeit not immediately, the extreme national emergency that made it possible for the Emperor to intervene effectively on behalf of surrender. Even then, it took two imperial interventions to end the war. [Stephen S. Large, Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A Political Biography (1992) p 125] Relocating the government to Korea or Manchuria meant permanently abandoning Japan--exile--the US Navy controlled the sea and air passages. Rjensen (talk) 03:55, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- Nevertheless, Pape and Wilson say that. Do you really believe these authors are not experts? Hirohito was more like a religious leader, so no exile could prevent it from ruling over his people.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:12, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- You did not read Pape closely: Pape does not discuss Korea or Manchuria--but he does state explicitly that by June 1945 "the connection with the Asian mainland was now completely cut" (p 127). There was no way to get the Emperor and gov't to Korea or Manchuria. He states: "the final straws, which led to acceptance of immediate surrender, were the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6 and the Soviet attack on August 9." [Pape p 183] Pape work is primarily about US planning & uses only American (& British) sources and uses no Japanese language sources. Mostly for Japanese thinking he relies on two old books (Butow--1954 and Kirby-1969 also Sigal 1989) Pape is indeed part of the debate--but he admits "The most widely accepted explanation of Japan's surrender is atomic coercion." so he agrees he's in the minority. (Pape p 191]. He does agree "the atomic bomb was the catalyst of the Emperor's decision" [p 185] but wants to say that J's military vulnerability was the most important long-term factor. Rjensen (talk) 05:01, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- Well, it seems you think I am claiming the Soviet invasion was the sole and primary factor. I do not say that. I only say that the role of atomic bombs was grossly exaggerated, and that stereotype was strong in the past; now, thanks to Pape, Wilson and other authors, the current point of view (not in a popular culture, of course) has changed.
- Regarding "complete cut", Pape, obviously meant a regular connection that allowed massive material or troops transfer. I am sure it would not be a problem to move Hirohito to Korea.
- I don't remember which author, probably Wilson (maybe, Pape) demonstrated that the main decision makers in Japanese cabinet were military, and their major base was a Kwantung Army headquarter. Only after the Soviet troops broke Kwantung army's resistance, the influence of the JIA dropped, and the "peace party" became capable of pushing the decision to surrender.--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:00, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- What led the Japanese leadership to end the war and the exact way this occurred is a famously complicated subject, and as far as I'm aware there isn't a consensus among historians on the topic. I'd suggest that the article not get into this huge debate, but simply link to the relevant article. Nick-D (talk) 07:21, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- Actually, I don't think any additional coverage of this topic is needed, the article in its present form describes that question quite adequately.--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:26, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- I agree with above This is a survey level article. Such minutia is better served in a separate article more focused to the subject. Mediatech492 (talk) 14:43, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- Actually, I don't think any additional coverage of this topic is needed, the article in its present form describes that question quite adequately.--Paul Siebert (talk) 07:26, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- What led the Japanese leadership to end the war and the exact way this occurred is a famously complicated subject, and as far as I'm aware there isn't a consensus among historians on the topic. I'd suggest that the article not get into this huge debate, but simply link to the relevant article. Nick-D (talk) 07:21, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- You did not read Pape closely: Pape does not discuss Korea or Manchuria--but he does state explicitly that by June 1945 "the connection with the Asian mainland was now completely cut" (p 127). There was no way to get the Emperor and gov't to Korea or Manchuria. He states: "the final straws, which led to acceptance of immediate surrender, were the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6 and the Soviet attack on August 9." [Pape p 183] Pape work is primarily about US planning & uses only American (& British) sources and uses no Japanese language sources. Mostly for Japanese thinking he relies on two old books (Butow--1954 and Kirby-1969 also Sigal 1989) Pape is indeed part of the debate--but he admits "The most widely accepted explanation of Japan's surrender is atomic coercion." so he agrees he's in the minority. (Pape p 191]. He does agree "the atomic bomb was the catalyst of the Emperor's decision" [p 185] but wants to say that J's military vulnerability was the most important long-term factor. Rjensen (talk) 05:01, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- Nevertheless, Pape and Wilson say that. Do you really believe these authors are not experts? Hirohito was more like a religious leader, so no exile could prevent it from ruling over his people.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:12, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- no--the Japanese leadership was hopelessly deadlocked. Stephen S. Larg states re the abombs: together with Russia’s subsequent entry into the war against Japan, politically they created, albeit not immediately, the extreme national emergency that made it possible for the Emperor to intervene effectively on behalf of surrender. Even then, it took two imperial interventions to end the war. [Stephen S. Large, Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A Political Biography (1992) p 125] Relocating the government to Korea or Manchuria meant permanently abandoning Japan--exile--the US Navy controlled the sea and air passages. Rjensen (talk) 03:55, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- Incorrect. The Japanese leadership still believed they could move the Emperor and his government to Korea or Manchuria, it was a wast territory with a strong economic potential, which was not affected by war. Soviet invasion deprived them of that opportunity, but atomic bombing did not prevent that. Second, had you been familiar with the subject, you would have known that the main reason for Japanese refusal to surrender was that Americans disagreed to preserve imperial institutions, which means there were absolutely no reason to expect the Emperor would continue to rule. --Paul Siebert (talk) 02:04, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- with the abomb the Army could no longer protect the Emperor in Tokyo--he had to leave (for the mountains) or surrender. Leaving meant he could no longer rule, and surrender meant that he could rule. He made the decision. USSR invasion did not involve a similar threat to the emperor. Rjensen (talk) 01:32, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
- Correct. Japan was essentially defeated by mid 1945, and that was achieved by conventional warfare in Pacific. Atomic bombing hadn't added too much to that. Japanese military were not impressed with conventional or atomic bombing of cities, partially because their main base in Manchuria was still pretty safe, and because Korea still had a significant industrial and military potential. However, when the USSR broke a neutrality pact, and Kwantung army demonstrated poor fighting capabilities, the position of the war party in Japanese establishment had been shaken, and they agreed to surrender unconditionally.--Paul Siebert (talk) 15:33, 11 November 2018 (UTC)
"page needed" in the Axis attack of the USSR section
We already discussed this question recently, and I explained that these references are to journal articles, the first and last page are already provided. Wikipedia standards require a exact page only when a book is used as a source (which it totally reasonable, because articles are small, and they are devoted to some narrow topic). Adding the "page needed" template to journal articles, despite the fact that that issue has already been explained on the talk page, is unacceptable. I put notes to the article's text, and if the "page needed" template will appear again, I will consider it as a bad faith attempts to cast a doubt on the article's content and to spoil the article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:45, 12 November 2018 (UTC)
Kuril islands
The lead currently says:
- With an invasion of the Japanese archipelago imminent, the possibility of additional atomic bombings, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and occupation of the Kuril islands in northern Japan, the Empire finally surrendered on 2 September 1945...
However, Japan announced its surrender on 15 August, and the islands were occupied after that. The same anachronism is repeated in the body of the article. Also, why is the invasion of Korea not mentioned as well? Clearly, this was a threat to Japan.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:24, 19 November 2018 (UTC)
- This is a good catch. I'd suggest changing this sentence to "With an invasion of the Japanese archipelago imminent, the possibility of additional atomic bombings, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, Japan announced its intention to surrender on 15 August 1945, cementing total victory in Asia for the Allies". The Kurils were an unimportant sideshow which don't belong in the lead (Manchuria was by far the main Soviet effort, and a key factor in Japan's surrender). The 2 September date is somewhat bureaucratic - hostilities ceased on the 15th. Nick-D (talk) 09:31, 19 November 2018 (UTC)
- Yes, I think that would be an improvement.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:34, 19 November 2018 (UTC)
- Yes, Kurils hardly deserve mention. With regard to Manchuria, some authors think that even the very fact that the USSR broke a neutrality pact was a key factor: Japan was still hoping she could have initiated some negotiations about surrender term, and the USSR, being a neutral party, could be a mediator in those negotiations. When the USSR broke a neutrality, it shattered the last Japan's hope for more favorable surrender terms, so there were no reason to continue the war. Therefore, I would suggest:
- ""With an invasion of the Japanese archipelago imminent, the possibility of additional atomic bombings, the Soviet entry into the war against Japan and its invasion of Manchuria, Japan announced its intention to surrender on 15 August 1945, cementing total victory in Asia for the Allies"
- --Paul Siebert (talk) 16:49, 19 November 2018 (UTC)
- That looks good to me Nick-D (talk) 09:00, 20 November 2018 (UTC)
- Yes, Kurils hardly deserve mention. With regard to Manchuria, some authors think that even the very fact that the USSR broke a neutrality pact was a key factor: Japan was still hoping she could have initiated some negotiations about surrender term, and the USSR, being a neutral party, could be a mediator in those negotiations. When the USSR broke a neutrality, it shattered the last Japan's hope for more favorable surrender terms, so there were no reason to continue the war. Therefore, I would suggest:
- Yes, I think that would be an improvement.--Jack Upland (talk) 09:34, 19 November 2018 (UTC)
Axis collapse, Allied victory (1944–45)
I made several changes that, I believe, will cause no objections. My explanations are below.
- 1. I added the discussion of the Operation Spring Awakening, which was the last Germany's offensive. By its scale it was comparable to the battle of the Bulge, and strategic implications were very significant.
- 2. I added the battle of Battle of Königsberg, which had much greater scale than the battle of Hamburg.
- 3. I regrouped the text to explain what parts of Germany remained unoccupied by the time Soviet and American troops met at Elbe.
- 4. I removed the mention of surrender of German troops in Italy, because there were several local surrenders in different parts of Europe, and I do not understand why surrender in Italy deserves a separate mention.
- 5. I put a description of the Battle of Berlin into a separate paragraph to emphasize political, military, and symbolic importance of that battle.
I hope these edits are not controversial.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:44, 31 October 2018 (UTC)
- I reverted you on the Italian surrender. It is significant as the first "unconditional" surrender of the Germans. Srnec (talk) 01:03, 2 November 2018 (UTC)
I also propose to significantly shorten this text:
- Meanwhile, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) were destroying strategic and populated cities and towns in Japan in an effort to destroy Japanese war industry and civilian morale. On the night of 9–10 March, USAAF B-29 bombers struck Tokyo with thousands of incendiary bombs, which killed 100,000 civilians and destroyed 16 square miles (41 km2) within a few hours. Over the next five months, the USAAF firebombed a total of 67 Japanese cities, killing 393,000 civilians and destroying 65% of built-up areas.[1]"
This text provides too many details. We do not tell how many civilians were killed in Hamburg, Warsaw, London, Hiroshima. I don't understand why Tokyo should be an exception. We do not tell what part of German or Soviet urban areas was destroyed, and I don't understand why should we tell about Japan. I propose this version:
- "Meanwhile, the United States Army Air Forces launched a massibe firebombing campaign of strategic cities in Japan in an effort to destroy Japanese war industry and civilian morale. A devastating bombing raid of 9–10 March destroyed a significant part of Japanese capital and killed large number of civilians. In total, the campaign lead to destruction of more than a half of urban areas.[2]