Draft:Destruction of Chechen aviation

Since 1993, the Russian Federation began to provide military support to Chechen forces opposed to the government of Dzokhar Dudayev.^[2] In the spring of 1994, Dudayev completed a full program of preparation for war with Russia. The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov, prepared a plan of action for the armed forces during a threatened period and when the situation becomes more complicated. The plan was approved by Dudayev and agreed upon with the head of the State Security Department of Chechnya, Sultan Gelikhanov. As a former division commander and a high-class pilot, General Dudayev understood that air strikes against Russia could undoubtedly have great psychological and factual significance.

In September 1994, Dudaev signed the Lasso plan.

In order to ensure the high-quality implementation of the Lasso plan, which provides for air strikes against important government and military infrastructure facilities of the enemy, the disabling of which is associated with the course and outcome of hostilities in the region, I order:

1. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI should develop a schedule for the distribution of enemy strategic targets for attacks by attack aircraft of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, indicating the carriers of weapons, means of destruction, performers of combat missions and signals of combat readiness of flight crews.

2. Establish formalized cases at specified enemy targets and exercise constant control over their daily activities.

3. Upon my signal to the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI, ensure the immediate delivery to me of the "Dagger" and "Ozone" packages, the files of the objects and the officials I have indicated to receive tasks after the completion of combat orders. The deadline for the development of the necessary formalized documents according to the "Lasso" plan is by the end of September 20, 1994. I entrust control over the implementation of this order to the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, General D. Dudayev.

Postscript : Maskhadov.

1. These documents must be provided in a separate folder under the heading.
2. Formulate the task for all pilots.

Dudayev

Since September 30, 1994, military installations in Chechnya have been subject to raids by Su-25 attack aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters without identification marks. The Russian military departments categorically denied that these aircraft belonged to the Russian armed forces.^[2]

Back in 1992, Dudayev planned to form combat, training and transport squadrons. But by 1994, only one combat squadron was formed using L-29 and L-39 aircraft. The flight crew included 41 pilots.The aviation fleet had aircraft that were previously part of the training aviation regiment of the Armavir Flight School. The L-29 "Dolphin" and L-39 "Albatross" combat training aircraft are capable of carrying unguided rockets or two 100 kg bombs. Previously, the Grozny DOSAAF flying club was assigned training fighters MIG-15 and MIG-17, there were several AN-2 transport aircraft and Mi-8 helicopters.^[3]

In total, at the Kalinovskaya airbase, the Armavir Military Aviation School left 39 L-39 trainers, 80 L-29 trainers, 3 MiG-17 fighters, 2 MiG-15UTI, 6 An-2 aircraft and 2 Mi-8 helicopters. There are 72 L-39 and 69 L-29 training equipment left at the Khankala base. All training facilities were equipped with holders for suspending two UB-16 NURS blocks of 16 missiles each. In principle, the Chechen Air Force could conduct offensive operations and launch missile and bomb attacks hundreds of kilometers from its borders.^[4]  According to federal intelligence, D. Dudayev had more than 250 aircraft of various classes and purposes at his disposal, which could be used as bomber aircraft. These were DOSAAF, Air Defense Aviation, and Aeroflot aircraft, appropriated by the Dudayev regime. By November 1994, of the indicated number of Chechen aircraft, no more than 40%, or about 100 aircraft, were in combat-ready condition. The remaining machines were used as a source of spare parts or were faulty.

The identification marks of the Chechen Air Force in the form of the coat of arms of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, applied over a red star with shortened rays, were applied only to some Dolphins and Albatrosses. The remaining aircraft of the Chechen aviation retained Soviet markings.^[5]

According to Russian Air Force Commander-in-Chief Pyotr Deinekin :

"We started at the end of November last year [1994]. Air reconnaissance reported: more than 200 aircraft, both transport and combat training, were concentrated at Dudayev's airports, ready to hang ammunition. The talk was about 100 kg bombs and unguided rockets . There were also helicopters, as well as the personal presidential Tu-134 . We have established: there are plans to bomb Russian cities. The crews were assigned to groups, everyone knew their route, what goals to act on"

The availability and training of Chechen flight personnel left much to be desired. For 251 aircraft there were only 41 trained pilots, and their composition was heterogeneous: most of them were presumably either called up from the reserves, or civil aviation pilots, or pilots who had undergone initial flight training. Therefore, as part of the construction of his armed forces, D. Dudayev trained about a hundred more pilots at the former base of the Armavir School. In addition, about 40 people were sent to Turkey for flight training.^[4]  But in addition to the Chechen pilots, in Grozny there was a group of experienced pilots - mercenaries from 10 former Soviet Air Force officers who had come to Chechnya from various CIS countries . It was they who, on September 6, 1994, at the military parade in honor of Independence Day, led a squadron of Albatross over the center of Grozny in clear formation.^[6]

On March 24, the head of the aviation school for pilots and technicians of the Chechen Air Force received a preliminary combat order to prepare flight crews for combat missions: two L-29 and two L-39 aircraft. Combat duty was organized at the Kalinovskaya airfield, and the petroleum products processing plant received instructions to supply uninterrupted fuel and lubricants. Information on the readiness of flight crews, technical personnel and aircraft equipment for combat operations was submitted to the main headquarters of the Armed Forces of the ChRI by 10:00 on March 26, 1994.^[3]

The Chechens studied the experience of Sweden, Switzerland, Germany and other countries in using straight sections of paved highways as a runway, for which they were actively preparing. Importance was also attached to the restoration of the aircraft fleet.

The air defense of Chechen air bases consisted of 10 Strela - 10 air defense systems, 23 anti-aircraft artillery installations of various types and 7 Igla - 1 MANPADS . The Chechens also had a sufficient number of Strela-2 and Stinger MANPADS, which were apparently purchased after 1992.  According to some information, the Stingers were in the hands of Arab and Afghan mercenaries who fought on the side of D. Dudayev.^[4]

The first aircraft to take action were Su-24MR front-line reconnaissance aircraft, which provided aerial reconnaissance of Chechen airfields and other military installations at the end of November. Aerial photography of the main objects was carried out from them. Although Chechen aviation only had the capability to use unguided weapons, it posed a threat to air bases, military installations, as well as federal troops when moving into specified areas. It was decided to launch a pre-emptive strike on Chechen airfields with the aim of destroying Dudayev's aviation group on the ground.^[7]The first strike was carried out by Su-25 attack aircraft early in the morning of December 1, 1994 at the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields, where Chechen combat aircraft were based. The attack was carried out using NURS and aerial bombs. As a result of the raid, all of Dudayev's combat aircraft on the ground were destroyed. The Chechen air defense of the airfields was taken by surprise due to the effect of surprise; not a single attacking aircraft was lost.^[7]  According to Dudayevites, one attack aircraft was shot down in the Chernorechye area (a former urban-type settlement, now a microdistrict of the city of Grozny ), however, the federal media completely reject this statement.

In the afternoon, the Grozny-Severny airfield was also raided . Here Russian bombs hit about a dozen An-2s, 6 Tu-134s, including D. Dudayev's personal plane, 3 Mi-8s ( from 2 to 4 in different sources ) and 1 Tu-154 . At the same time, the pilots bombed in such a way that repairing the runways required minimal time. In total, at this stage, 177 aircraft were destroyed and damaged, 4 storage facilities with ammunition and weapons were destroyed. Long-range aviation 8 Tu-22M3 using luminous bombs illuminated the combat area.^[6]  The terminal buildings and airfield equipment received minimal damage. This time, heavy anti-aircraft fire was fired at the attacking aircraft, but not a single aircraft was lost.^[6]

Long-range aviation, in 46 sorties carried out in early December, struck airfields and areas where manpower and equipment were concentrated. At the same time, long-range aviation aircraft destroyed and damaged 89 aircraft, 89 armored vehicles (6 tanks, 4 ZSU, 12 armored personnel carriers, 65 vehicles), and destroyed 12 warehouses with ammunition and weapons. Front-line aviation forces carried out 198 sorties, including 71 sorties for bombing and assault strikes.

General Troshev wrote in his memoirs about this operation:

"An aviation group specially designed to eliminate gang formations was stationed at several airfields. Even before the troops began moving into Chechnya, our pilots carried out bombing attacks on four airfields (Khankala, Kalinovskaya, Grozny-Severny and Katayama). 130 aircraft and 4 helicopters, a fuel depot, and an antenna field were destroyed, as a result not a single Chechen Air Force aircraft ever took off.  "

The neutralization of Chechen aviation, even before the start of active hostilities, became the first and greatest success of Russian aviation during the entire first Chechen war. During the operation to destroy Chechen aviation, according to various sources, from 130^[8]  to 177^[6]  aircraft, from 2^[8]  to 4^[6]  helicopters, and a fuel and lubricants warehouse were destroyed. The Russian Air Force did not lose a single aircraft during the operation, and not a single Chechen aircraft was able to take off.

However, according to D. Dudayev's wife, Alla Dudayeva, some Chechen planes were still able to take off:^[9]

"On September 30, Russian helicopters bombed the civilian airport Severny, then training aircraft at the Kalinovsky airport in the Naursky district. All our small aircraft were destroyed. Russian media reported to the whole world that all combat aircraft, military equipment and weapons of Dudayev were destroyed. But there was only one homemade airplane left, standing in the yard of a local villager, a genius inventor. In peacetime, when cows strayed from the herd in the mountains, neighbors came to him asking him to fly in search. Now he was flying reconnaissance to the border, marking on the map the movement of Russian tank columns, which kept coming and coming. It seemed that all of Russia consisted of clanging tanks. This homemade airplane was very soon shot down, and its inventor also died...

... The old "maize plant" (An-2), which was under repair and therefore miraculously survived the destruction of the Kalinovsky training center, after the first bombing, desperately soared over the burning houses towards the armada of bombers and was demonstratively shot in the air on takeoff. The Russian pilots were just having fun shooting him; they weren't risking anything."

Dzhokhar Dudayev sent a telegram to the Russian Air Force Commander-in-Chief Pyotr Deinekin :

"I congratulate the leadership of the Russian Air Force on achieving dominance in the skies of Ichkeria. Meet me on the ground."^[9]

There is also an opinion that this action was more likely of a propaganda than a real combat nature, since in reality the Chechen combat training attack aircraft could not inflict serious damage on Russian units in mountainous terrain.^[6]